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REFORMING FINANCIAL REGULATION TO 
ADDRESS THE TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL PROBLEM 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
he ongoing financial crisis—widely viewed as the worst since the 
Great Depression1—has inflicted tremendous damage on financial 
markets and economies around the world. The crisis has revealed funda-
mental weaknesses in the financial regulatory systems of the United 
States (“U.S.”), the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), and other European na-
tions, making regulatory reforms an urgent priority. Publicly-funded bai-
louts of “too big to fail” (“TBTF”) financial institutions have provided 
indisputable proof that (i) TBTF institutions benefit from large explicit 
and implicit public subsidies, and (ii) those subsidies distort economic 
incentives and encourage excessive risk-taking by large, complex finan-
cial institutions (“LCFIs”). Accordingly, the primary objective of regula-
tory reforms must be to eliminate (or at least greatly reduce) TBTF sub-
sidies and to force LCFIs to internalize the risks and costs of their activi-
ties. 
Parts I and II of this article survey the consequences and causes of the 
current financial crisis. As described in Part I, the financial crisis has 
                                                                                                                       
 *  Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I am deeply grate-
ful for the superb research assistance provided by C. Scott Pollock, a member of our 
Class of 2010, and by Germaine Leahy, Head of Reference for the Jacob Burns Law Li-
brary. For helpful comments and conversations, I wish to express my great appreciation 
to Bill Bratton, John Buchman, Rick Carnell, Jim Cox, Larry Cunningham, Kathleen 
Engel, Jim Fanto, Anna Gelpern, Erik Gerding, Ann Graham, Adam Levitin, Jeff Manns, 
Pat McCoy, Larry Mitchell, Heidi Schooner, and Zephyr Teachout, as well as other par-
ticipants in law school symposia held at Brooklyn, Fordham, George Washington and the 
University of Pennsylvania, all of which explored various aspects of the financial crisis. 
Unless otherwise indicated, this article includes developments through March 15, 2010. 
 1. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglo-
merates and the Origins of the Subprime Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 966 n.3 (2009) 
(quoting views of regulators and analysts describing the current financial crisis as the 
worst since the Great Depression); see also The Causes and Current State of the Finan-
cial Crisis: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 3, 4 tbl.1 (Jan. 13, 
2010) (written testimony of Mark Zandi, Chief Economic and Cofounder of Moody’s 
Economy.com), available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Zandi.pdf 
[hereinafter 2010 Zandi Testimony] (stating that the current financial crisis caused a 
“Great Recession” that is “the longest, broadest and most severe since the Great Depres-
sion”); Michael McKee & Peter Cook, Paulson Says U.S. Was ‘Close’ to Financial Col-
lapse (Update 3), BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 2, 2010 (reporting the view of former Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson that “[t]he U.S. economy came ‘very close’ to collapsing into a 
second Great Depression”). 
T
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caused governments around the globe to provide more than $11 trillion 
of assistance to financial institutions and to spend more than $6 trillion 
on economic stimulus programs. The bulk of those expenditures have 
occurred in the U.S., the U.K. and other nations in the European Union 
(“EU”), where the crisis has inflicted the greatest damage. In the U.S., 
the federal government provided $6 trillion of assistance to financial in-
stitutions and guaranteed the survival of the nineteen largest banking or-
ganizations and the largest insurance company. The U.K. and other EU 
nations provided more than $4 trillion of assistance and conducted simi-
lar bailouts of LCFIs. Notwithstanding these extraordinary measures, the 
economies and financial systems of the U.S., U.K., and EU remained 
fragile and vulnerable to further shocks in early 2010. In particular, ana-
lysts warned about the potential impact of widespread defaults and forec-
losures on residential and commercial mortgages, as well as the risks 
posed by large budget deficits in many developed countries. 
The severity of the financial crisis has alarmed the public and produced 
a strong consensus in favor of reforming financial regulation in the U.S. 
and other developed nations.2 In order to identify the most critically 
needed reforms, Part II of this article summarizes the basic causes of the 
crisis in the U.S. The unsound residential and commercial mortgage 
loans that devastated the U.S. financial system shared a common set of 
problems with high-risk credit card loans and corporate leveraged buyout 
(“LBO”) loans that banks also originated during the credit boom that 
precipitated the current crisis. As described in Part II.A., LCFIs followed 
an “originate-to-distribute” (“OTD”) strategy in all four credit markets 
that led to the production and securitization of huge volumes of high-risk 
loans.3 This OTD strategy enabled LCFIs to earn large fees from (i) ori-
ginating high-risk loans, (ii) pooling those loans to create a variety of 
structured-finance securities, and (iii) distributing those securities to in-
                                                                                                                       
 2. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, With Populist Stance, Obama Takes on Banks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1 (reporting that “big banks have miscalculated Americans’ 
intensified resentment against the bailout [of LCFIs during the financial crisis]—anger 
stoked by persistent high unemployment, banks’ stinginess in lending to small business 
and the revival of Wall Street’s bonus culture”); Simon Clark, ‘Lepers‘ in London Defend 
Right to Make Money as Election Looms, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 25, 2010 (reporting on 
public revulsion against large U.K. banks “after British taxpayers assumed liabilities of 
more than [$1.23 trillion] to bail out the country’s lenders”). 
 3. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 988–91, 1037–40 (reporting that, in 2007, residential 
mortgage-backed securities accounted for nearly two-thirds of all U.S. residential mort-
gages, while commercial mortgage-backed securities represented almost a quarter of 
domestic commercial mortgages, asset-backed securities accounted for more than a quar-
ter of domestic consumer loans, and collateralized loan obligations included more than a 
tenth of global leveraged syndicated loans). 
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vestors. Bank managers and regulators operated under the illusion that 
the OTD business model would permit LCFIs to transfer the risks em-
bedded in securitized loans to investors who bought the structured-
finance securities derived from those loans. 
However, as discussed in Part II.B, LCFIs in fact pursued an “originate 
to not really distribute” approach in two major respects. First, LCFIs 
kept large amounts of AAA-rated tranches of structured-finance securi-
ties on their balance sheets because (1) those tranches paid significantly 
higher yields than conventional AAA-rated investments, (2) federal regu-
lations assessed very low capital charges against AAA-rated securities, 
and (3) LCFIs retained AAA-rated tranches that could not be sold imme-
diately in order to complete more securitization deals, earn more fees and 
produce higher short-term profits. Second, LCFIs transferred large vo-
lumes of AAA-rated tranches to off-balance-sheet (“OBS”) conduits, 
which LCFIs supported by providing explicit and implicit liquidity guar-
antees. After the financial crisis erupted in mid-2007, many LCFI spon-
sors provided financial support to their sponsored conduits or brought the 
conduits’ assets back onto their balance sheets. Ultimately, LCFIs suf-
fered devastating losses from structured-finance securities they retained 
on their balance sheets or parked in OBS conduits. 
Part II.C explains that LCFIs were the primary, private-sector catalysts 
for the financial crisis because they generated most of the financing for 
the unsustainable bubbles that occurred in the residential and commercial 
real estate markets and in the corporate LBO market. Consequently, as 
shown in Part II.D, LCFIs also became the leading recipients of govern-
ment support measures. In the U.S., U.K., and the EU, governments en-
gineered massive bailouts of leading banks, securities firms and insurers, 
thereby cementing the TBTF status of those entities. 
Thus, the financial crisis has provided dramatic evidence of the com-
petitive and regulatory distortions created by TBTF financial institutions. 
Part III of the article proposes five regulatory reforms that are designed 
to eliminate (or at least greatly reduce) the extensive public subsidies 
currently enjoyed by LCFIs that are presumptively TBTF. First, as de-
scribed in Part III, existing statutory limitations on growth by large banks 
should be strengthened. Second, LCFIs whose failure would pose a sys-
temic threat to the stability of the financial system should be publicly 
designated as systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”). A 
special resolution regime should be established for handling each actual 
or threatened failure of a SIFI. This resolution regime, which would be 
administered by the FDIC, should follow the essential principles of a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, including (i) wiping out the invest-
ments of the SIFI’s shareholders; (ii) dismissing the SIFI’s senior execu-
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tives and directors, and (iii) requiring the SIFI’s creditors to accept “hair-
cuts” in the form of less-than-full payment of their claims or conversion 
of their claims into equity interests in a successor institution. 
The third proposed regulatory reform would subject each SIFI to con-
solidated supervision by the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) and would 
require each SIFI to comply with systemic risk capital requirements 
(“SRCRs”). Fourth, each SIFI would be required to pay insurance pre-
miums to create a systemic risk insurance fund (“SRIF”) that would cov-
er the future costs of resolving failed SIFIs. SRCRs and SRIF premiums 
should be established jointly by the FRB and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (“FDIC”). The SRIF should be kept strictly separate 
from the existing Deposit Insurance Fund (“DIF”). To prevent the DIF 
from being used to support future bailouts of TBTF institutions, Con-
gress should prohibit the DIF from making any payment to uninsured 
creditors of banking organizations. 
Finally, to ensure that SIFIs cannot exploit the federal safety net to 
subsidize speculative activities in the capital markets, a two-tiered sys-
tem of banking regulation and deposit insurance should be established. 
The first tier of “traditional” banking organizations could provide servic-
es that are “closely related” to banking. However, those entities would 
not be allowed to engage, or affiliate with firms engaged in securities 
underwriting or dealing, insurance underwriting, or derivatives dealing. 
First-tier banks would operate under their current supervisory arrange-
ments, including their existing deposit insurance. 
By contrast, the second tier of “nontraditional” banking organizations 
would be allowed to engage in securities underwriting and dealing, in-
surance underwriting, and derivatives dealing. However, second-tier 
banking organizations (which presumably would include the largest fi-
nancial firms) would be required to organize their banking subsidiaries as 
“narrow banks.” Narrow banks could offer FDIC-insured checking and 
savings accounts, but they could not offer uninsured deposits. Those 
banks would effectively operate as FDIC-insured Money Market Mutual 
Funds (“MMMFs”), and their assets would be limited to cash and mar-
ketable, short-term debt obligations such as qualifying government se-
curities and highly-rated commercial paper. Narrow banks would be pro-
hibited from making any loans or other transfers of funds to their affili-
ates, except for paying lawful dividends to their holding companies. In 
addition, narrow banks would be prohibited from purchasing derivatives, 
except for bona fide hedging purposes, or from dealing in derivatives. 
The primary objectives of the narrow bank concept, in conjunction with 
the other four proposed reforms, would be (i) to prevent financial con-
glomerates from using FDIC-insured deposits as a source of low-cost 
2010] REFORMING FINANCIAL REGULATION 711 
funding for speculative activities in the capital markets, and (ii) to com-
pel financial conglomerates to internalize the potential risks and costs of 
their capital markets activities. If financial conglomerates cannot produce 
attractive economic return without access to extensive public subsidies, 
they will face significant pressure from investors to break up voluntarily 
(in the same way that investors forced many industrial conglomerates to 
break up after 1980). 
I. THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The financial crisis has caused “[g]overnments and central banks 
around the world [to spend] more than $11 trillion to support the finan-
cial sector and about $6 trillion on fiscal stimulus programs.”4 The larg-
est financial support and economic stimulus programs have been imple-
mented by the U.S., the U.K., and other EU nations, where the financial 
crisis has caused the greatest harm.5 By mid-2009, authorities in those 
nations furnished more than $10 trillion of assistance to financial institu-
tions through central bank loans and other governmental loans, guaran-
tees, and capital infusions.6 The U.S. provided about $6 trillion of that 
amount to support its domestic financial sector.7 Additionally, the U.S. 
                                                                                                                       
 4. David M. Dickson, Debate Rages Over Stimulus Fallout, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 23, 
2010, at A1 (quoting Ruth Stroppiana, chief international economist for Moody’s Econ-
omy.com); see also Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., The Elephant in the Room: The Need 
to Deal with What Banks Do, 2009 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. J.: FIN. MKT. 
TRENDS VOL. 2, 1, 14, 15 tbl.4, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/44357464.pdf (showing that leading nations around 
the world provided an estimated $11.4 trillion of capital infusions, asset purchases and 
guarantees, and debt guarantees and facilities to financial institutions through October 
2009). 
 5. Int’l Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Navigating the Financial 
Challenges Ahead, at 4–5, 6–10, 24–29 (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf [hereinafter October 2009 
IMF GFS Report]; Withdrawing the Drugs: Tightening Economic Policy, THE 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010, [hereinafter Tightening Economic Policy]. 
 6. See Blundell-Wignall et al., supra note 4, at 15 tbl.4. 
 7. In April 2009, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) reported that the U.S., 
the U.K.., and European Union (“EU”) nations had provided $9 trillion of support to 
financial institutions, including $4.7 trillion provided by U.S. authorities and $4.3 trillion 
provided by U.K. and other EU agencies. Int’l Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability 
Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risk, at 41, 44 
tbl.1.7 (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf [hereinafter April 2009 
IMF GFS Report]). The IMF estimated that the $4.7 trillion of financial sector support 
provided by U.S. authorities included $1.8 trillion of government guarantees. Id. Howev-
er, the IMF estimate evidently did not include additional guarantees that the U.S. gov-
ernment provided to support money market mutual funds (“MMMFs”) following the 
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Congress passed an $800 billion economic stimulus bill in 2009, and 
other nations have adopted similar programs.8 
Government agencies have acted most dramatically in rescuing LCFIs 
that were threatened with failure. U.S. authorities bailed out two of the 
three largest U.S. banks and the largest U.S. insurance company.9 In ad-
dition, federal regulators provided financial support for emergency ac-
quisitions of two other major banks, the two largest thrifts, and two of 
the five largest securities firms, and regulators also approved emergency 
conversions of two other leading securities firms into bank holding com-
panies (“BHCs”), thereby placing those institutions under the FRB’s pro-
                                                                                                                       
failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In June 2009, the Congressional Over-
sight Panel (“COP”) provided an estimate of U.S. financial sector assistance that was 
very close to the IMF estimate. The COP report stated that federal authorities had pro-
vided $4.6 trillion of support to financial institutions, including $500 billion of capital 
infusions, $2.2 trillion of loans and $1.8 trillion of guarantees. CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: STRESS TESTING AND SHORING UP BANK 
CAPITAL 142–48, June 9, 2009, available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
060909-report.pdf [hereinafter June 2009 COP Report]. However, the COP report noted 
that its estimate did not include the potential cost of the guarantee program established by 
the Treasury Department to support MMMFs. Id. at 148 n.272. In November 2009, COP 
reported that the Treasury guarantee program had covered up to $3.2 trillion of MMMF 
customer accounts between the program’s initiation in September 2008 and its expiration 
in September 2009. COP estimated that the Treasury’s “practical exposure” under its 
guarantee program was probably less than half of the maximum potential exposure, be-
cause “a majority of the assets in covered [MMMF] accounts” consisted of Treasury bills 
or other federally-guaranteed securities. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER 
OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED 
PROGRAMS 27, 35, Nov. 6, 2009, available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
110609-report.pdf [hereinafter November 2009 COP Report]. Assuming that the Trea-
sury Department’s actual exposure under the MMMF guarantee program was less than 
half of the maximum $3.2 trillion of assets held by MMMFs, it seems appropriate to add 
about $1.4 trillion of MMMF guarantees to the $4.6 trillion estimate developed by COP 
in June 2009. Based on that assumption, it appears that U.S. authorities provided approx-
imately $6 trillion of assistance to financial institutions in 2009, as compared with the 
$4.3 trillion of financial sector support provided by U.K. and EU agencies as reported by 
the IMF. See Blundell-Wignall et al., supra note 4, at 15 tbl.4 (concluding that the U.S. 
provided approximately $6.4 trillion of financial sector support through October 2009, 
while Europe provided nearly $4.3 trillion of such support). 
 8. See Dickson, supra note 4; William Pesek, After the Stimulus Binge, A Debt Han-
gover, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 26, 2010, at 14; Tightening Economic Policy, 
supra note 5. 
 9. For discussions of the federal government’s bailouts of Citigroup, Bank of Amer-
ica (“BofA”) and American International Group (“AIG”), see DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE 
TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 3, 25–26, 189–97, 239–41, 259–63 
(2009); Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk 
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 1327, 1364–66 (2009); Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1044–45. 
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tective umbrella.10 Federal regulators also conducted “stress tests” on the 
nineteen largest BHCs—each with more than $100 billion of assets—and 
injected more than $220 billion of capital into eighteen of those compa-
nies.11 Before regulators performed the stress tests, they announced that 
the federal government would provide any additional capital that the ni-
neteen banking firms needed but could not raise on their own. By giving 
that public assurance, regulators indicated that all nineteen firms were 
presumptively TBTF, at least for the duration of the current financial 
crisis.12 
                                                                                                                       
 10. For descriptions of the federal government’s support for the acquisitions of Wa-
chovia by Wells Fargo, of National City Bank by PNC, of Bear Stearns (“Bear”) and 
Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) by JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”), and of Countrywide and 
Merrill Lynch (“Merrill”) by BofA, as well as the rapid conversions of Goldman Sachs 
(“Goldman”) and Morgan Stanley into BHCs, see DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY: THE NEW PARADIGM 182–
84, 398–405, 412–17 (2010); WESSEL, supra note 9, at 8–9, 18–19, 147–72, 217–26, 
239–41, 259–63; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1044–45; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. 
Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and 
Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection 27–30 
(Geo. Wash. U. Law Sch. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory, Working Paper No. 479, 2009), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499216. 
 11. June 2009 COP Report, supra note 7, at 7–8, 13–27, 51–52 fig.4 (reporting that 
the U.S. government provided $217 billion of capital to 18 of the 19 largest U.S. bank 
holding companies, and describing the “stress tests” performed on those firms); Dakin 
Campbell, David Mildenberg & Robert Schmidt, GMAC Gets $3.8 Billion in Third U.S. 
Bailout Package (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 31, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=agcYWuOIJVRg# (describ-
ing the federal government’s infusion of $3.8 billion of additional capital into GMAC). 
 12. In announcing the “stress test” for the 19 largest banking firms in early 2009, 
federal regulators “emphasized that none of the banks would be allowed to fail the test, 
because the government would provide any capital that was needed to ensure the survival 
of all nineteen banks.” Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1050 n.449 (citing speech by Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York president William C. Dudley and congressional testimony by 
FRB chairman Ben Bernanke); Joe Adler, In Focus: Stress Tests Complicate ‘Too Big to 
Fail’ Debate, AM. BANKER, May 19, 2009, at 1, available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/174_98/-378732-1.html (stating that “[b]y draw-
ing a line at $100 billion of assets, and promising to give the 19 institutions over that 
mark enough capital to weather an economic downturn, the government appears to have 
defined which banks are indeed ‘too big to fail’”). Based on the stress tests, regulators 
determined that ten of the 19 firms required additional capital. June 2009 COP Report, 
supra note 7, at 25–27. Nine of those firms were successful in raising the needed funds, 
but the federal government provided $11.3 billion of additional capital to GMAC when 
that company could not raise the required capital on its own. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXITING TARP AND UNWINDING ITS IMPACT ON THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 100–04, 160 (Jan. 13, 2010), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-011410-report.pdf [hereinafter January 2010 COP 
Report]. 
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Similarly, the U.K. and other EU nations adopted more than eighty 
rescue programs to support their financial systems. Those programs in-
cluded costly bailouts of several major EU banks—including ABN 
Amro, Commerzbank, Fortis, ING, Lloyds HBOS (“Lloyds”), and Royal 
Bank of Scotland (“RBS”)—while Switzerland financed a similar recapi-
talization of UBS.13 
Despite these extraordinary measures of governmental support, finan-
cial institutions, commercial firms, and ordinary citizens suffered huge 
losses in the U.S. and other nations. Between the outbreak of the crisis in 
mid-2007 and the end of 2009, LCFIs around the world recorded $1.5 
trillion of losses on risky loans and investments made during the preced-
ing credit boom.14 The financial crisis pushed the economies of the U.S., 
the U.K., and other EU nations into deep recessions during 2008 and the 
first half of 2009.15 Economies in all three regions began to improve in 
                                                                                                                       
 13. For descriptions of governmental support measures for financial institutions in the 
U.K. and other European nations, see Fabio Panetta et al., An Assessment of Financial 
Sector Rescue Programmes (Bank of Int’l Settlements Paper No. 48, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1457664. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n Communications, State 
Aid: Overview of National Measures Adopted as a Response to the Financial/Economic 
Crisis (Jan. 26, 2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/13&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (listing 85 measures adopted by EU govern-
ments to support their financial sectors); John Goddard, Phil Molyneux & John O.S. Wil-
son, The Financial Crisis in Europe: Evolution, Policy Responses and Lessons for the 
Future (June 5, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414935&rec=1&srcabs=1350022; 
Jann Bettings, Commerzbank Net Loss Exceeds Estimates on Writedowns (Update 4), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 23, 2010; EC Approves More Bailout Funding for Dutch Banks 
Fortis, ABN AMRO, 94 BANKING REP. (BNA) 333 (2010); Bert Koster & Dan Fitzpatrick, 
ING to Cut Itself in Two to Repay Dutch Aid, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2009, at C1; Jon Me-
non & Andrew MacAskill, RBS, Lloyds Get $51 Billion in Second Bank Bailout (Update 
6), BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 3, 2009; Daniel Pruzin, International Banking: Switzerland 
Airs Plan to Bail Out UBS, Shore Up Financial System, 91 BANKING REP. (BNA) 686 
(2008). 
 14. Rodney Yap & Dave Pierson, Subprime Mortgage-Related Losses Exceed $1.74 
Trillion: Table, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 25, 2010 (showing that banks, securities firms 
and insurers incurred $1.49 trillion of writedowns and credit losses due to the financial 
crisis, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suffered an additional $250 billion of losses). 
As used in this article, the term “large, complex financial institution” (“LCFI”) includes 
major commercial banks, securities firms and insurance companies as well as “universal 
banks” (i.e., financial conglomerates that have authority to engage, either directly or 
through affiliates, in a combination of banking, securities, and insurance activities). See 
Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 968 n.15. 
 15. See Int’l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2009: Crisis and Re-
covery, at 1–96 (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
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the second half of 2009, but the recoveries were tentative and fragile.16 In 
early 2010, economies in all three areas continued to face significant 
challenges, including (i) high unemployment rates and shortages of bank 
credit that discouraged spending by consumers and investments by busi-
nesses; and (ii) large budget deficits that impaired the ability of govern-
ments to provide additional fiscal stimulus.17 
The impact of the financial crisis on the U.S. has been especially se-
vere. The collapse of housing and stock values inflicted devastating 
losses on homeowners and investors. Home prices nationwide fell by 
thirty percent from their peak in 2006 to their trough in 2009.18 At the 
beginning of 2010, more than a fifth of U.S. homeowners were “under-
water”—owing more on their mortgages than the value of their homes—
and nearly a seventh of all residential mortgages were delinquent or in 
foreclosure.19 Between October 2007 and March 2009, U.S. stock prices 
                                                                                                                       
 16. Int’l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2009: Sustaining the 
Recovery, at 1–92 (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf; Timothy R. Homan, U.S. 
Economy Grew at 2.2% Annual Rate Last Quarter (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 
22, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068&sid=aVeAMaVRygoM (report-
ing that the U.S. economy grew during the third quarter of 2009 “at a slower pace than 
anticipated,” following a steep decline during the previous year); Marcus Walker & Brian 
Blackstone, Euro-Zone Economy Returns to Expansion—Third-Quarter Growth Brings 
an End to Stretch of Contraction Dating to last Year, but Signals Fragility of Region’s 
Recovery, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2009, at A6 (reporting that “[t]he euro-zone economy 
returned to modest growth in the third quarter [of 2009], marking an apparent end to five 
quarters of recession, but the region’s recovery looks set to be anemic”). 
 17. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Three Indicators Spell Trouble for the Recovery, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at G01; Mark Deen, European Economy Risks Decoupling from 
Global Growth Recovery, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 26, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aD6mJGvUqkRE#; Jon 
Hilsenrath, U.S. News: Credit Remains Scarce in Hurdle to Recovery, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
27, 2010, at A2; Alistair MacDonald, Big Deficits Cloud Britain’s Future, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 8, 2010, at A1; Simone Meier, Europe’s Recovery Almost Stalls as Investment Drops 
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-
03-04/europe-s-recovery-almost-stalls-as-investment-drops-update1-.html.; Gretchen 
Morgenson, This Crisis Won’t Stop Moving, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, § BU, at 1; Pesek, 
supra note 8; Buttonwood, Finance and Economics: Stimulating debate, ECONOMIST, 
Feb. 6. 2010, at 81. 
 18. Renae Merle, Housing Recovery Could Take a Decade, Economists Warn, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A12; see also 2010 Zandi Testimony, supra note 1, at 9 chart 7 
(showing that a national index of housing prices rose from 100 at the end of 2000 to a 
high of 175 in 2006, before declining to a low of 120 in early 2009, and recovering 
slightly to 125 in late 2009). 
 19. See Daniel Taub, One-Fifth of U.S. Homeowners Owe More Than Properties Are 
Worth, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 10, 2010, 
716 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
fell by $10 trillion.20 Household wealth plummeted by $17.5 trillion dur-
ing the same period and less than a third of that loss was recovered dur-
ing a subsequent increase in stock prices and home values.21 As the fi-
nancial crisis deepened, consumers cut back on spending to reduce their 
heavy debt burdens and rebuild their depleted savings.22 
Rising rates of unemployment and consumer bankruptcies further dis-
couraged household consumption. The national unemployment rate 
reached ten percent in 2009, reflecting a loss of 8.4 million jobs since the 
end of 2007.23 Nearly 2.5 million individuals filed for bankruptcy in 
2008 and 2009.24 Falling demand by consumers for housing, goods, and 
services caused businesses to reduce production and lay off workers, the-
reby further depressing employment and economic activity.25 Businesses 
also suffered from the steepest decline in bank credit since the 1940s.26 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20603037&sid=at6VKvccpCzs# (reporting 
that in the fourth quarter of 2009, “21.4 percent of owners of mortgaged homes were 
underwater”); Seven Million Loans Are Behind on Payments, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, 
Feb. 15, 2010, at 18 (reporting that 13.3% of residential mortgages were delinquent or in 
foreclosure); CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT, 
TAKING STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 68, 68 
n.270 (Dec. 9, 2009), available at www.cop.senate.gov/gocuments/co-120909-report.pdf 
[hereinafter December 2009 COP Report] (reporting that 5.5 million home foreclosures 
were started, and two million foreclosures were completed, between July 2007 and Sep-
tember 2009). 
 20. David Henry et al., Waiting for the Bull to Return, BUS. WK., Mar. 16, 2009, at 
24–25. 
 21. 2010 Zandi Testimony, supra note 1, at 8, 8 chart 6 (showing that U.S. household 
wealth declined from a peak of $65.5 trillion in mid-2007 to a low of $48 trillion in early 
2009, before recovering to $53 trillion in late 2009). 
 22. The ratio of U.S. household debt to personal income rose from 87% in 1990 to 
139% in 2007, before declining to 131% in 2009. That decline in the household debt 
burden, along with a corresponding rise in the personal savings rate from zero to four 
percent, reflected a painful “deleveraging” by U.S. households in response to the finan-
cial crisis. See Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1010; James C. Cooper, Business Outlook: 
Consumers Won’t Drive a Recovery, BUS. WK., June 29, 2009, at 14; Reuven Glick & 
Kevin J. Lansing, U.S. Household Deleveraging and Future Consumption Growth, 
FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Cal.), May 15, 2009, at 3, available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2009/el2009-16.html. 
 23. Neil Irwin et al., White House Crafts Jobs Bill, a Year into Stimulus Effort, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A1. 
 24. David M. Dickson, Soaring Rate of Bankruptcies Expected to Continue in 2010, 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at A1. 
 25. Michael McKee, No Job Growth for Small Business Spurs Recovery Doubt (Up-
date 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 8, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=apZULWyXpqhE#; Paul 
Vigna & John Shipman, The Upshot: The Great Corporate Pullback, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
2010] REFORMING FINANCIAL REGULATION 717 
In early 2010, regulators and analysts identified serious problems in 
the commercial real estate (“CRE”) market as a further obstacle to eco-
nomic recovery. Commercial property values declined by more than for-
ty percent between October 2007 and October 2009, and default rates 
more than doubled on CRE loans held by banks during 2009.27 Banks 
held about half of the $3.4 trillion in outstanding CRE debt, and analysts 
estimated that banks could suffer $150 billion to $300 billion of losses on 
those loans.28 Many CRE loans fell into default because they were origi-
nated during the real estate boom, when lenders offered CRE loans with 
weak underwriting standards and lax payment terms that resembled the 
unsound features of subprime and Alt-A residential mortgages.29 Ana-
lysts feared that losses on defaulted CRE loans would further weaken the 
capacity of banks to provide credit to consumers and businesses. Com-
munity and regional banks, the primary providers of relationship loans to 
small businesses, were especially threatened because they held heavy 
concentrations of CRE loans.30 
In February 2010, the Congressional Oversight Panel (“COP”) warned 
that rising CRE loan defaults threatened to create a “negative feedback 
loop that suppresses economic recovery” because (i) losses from CRE 
loan defaults were causing banks to cut back on their lending to small 
businesses and consumers, thereby causing (ii) lower rates of consump-
tion and higher rates of business failures and unemployment, which 
would lead to (iii) higher vacancy rates in office buildings, stores, and 
                                                                                                                       
25, 2010, at B2; Editorial (United States), The Economy: The Trap, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 
2010, at 32. 
 26. Binyamin Appelbaum, Troubled Banking Industry Sharply Reduced Lending in 
2009, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2010, at A8 (reporting that U.S. banks cut their lending by 
$587 billion, or 7.5%, in 2009, “the largest annual decline since the 1940s”). 
 27. Brian Louis, U.S. Commercial Property Falls to Lowest in 7 Years (Update 3), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 21, 2009, 
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aHtqsgJE35sU; Dan Levy & Da-
vid Henry, Commercial Mortgage Default Rate in U.S. More Than Doubles, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-
20601206&sid=aExgk1dEfRrA#. 
 28. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: COMMERCIAL 
REAL ESTATE LOSSES AND THE RISK TO FINANCIAL STABILITY 36–38, 45–46, 102 (Feb. 10, 
2010), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-021110-report.pdf [hereinafter 
February 2010 COP Report]; Matthew Monks, CRE Losses Could Pass $150 Billion Next 
Year, AM. BANKER, Feb. 8, 2010, at 12; see also Louis, supra note 27 (reporting that $1.4 
trillion of CRE loans were scheduled to mature within five years and half of those loans 
were “underwater” because property values were worth less than the outstanding loans). 
 29. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1037–39; February 2010 COP Report, supra note 28, 
at 19–28, 62–64. 
 30. February 2010 COP Report, supra note 28, at 36–38, 42–46, 62–64, 78–81. 
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apartment buildings, which in turn would produce (iv) additional CRE 
loan defaults and further downward pressure on the economy.31 The COP 
cautioned that CRE loan defaults could inflict “a second wave of proper-
ty-based stress on the financial system—this time based on commercial 
rather than residential real estate.”32 
Losses from defaults on residential mortgages, CRE loans, and related 
securities have caused almost 200 FDIC-insured depository institutions 
to fail since 2007. Those failed institutions held assets of more than $500 
billion, and hundreds of additional banks are likely to fail in the near fu-
ture.33 Thus, in early 2010, the ability of the U.S. financial system and 
the general economy to recover from the financial crisis remained in se-
rious doubt. 
II. LCFIS’ RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
In order to design regulatory reforms that could prevent a similar crisis 
in the future, it is essential to understand that LCFIs were the primary 
private-sector catalysts for the current financial crisis. This Part analyzes 
the crucial role played by LCFIs in helping to produce the financial and 
economic conditions that led to the crisis. The discussion will briefly 
refer to governmental policies that compounded the disastrous errors of 
LCFIs, but its main focus will be on the LCFIs’ responsibility for the 
crisis. 
A. LCFIs Originated Huge Volumes of Risky Loans and Helped to Inflate 
a Massive Credit Boom That Precipitated the Crisis 
1. LCFIs Used Securitization to Originate Risky Loans and to Distribute 
Hazardous Securities Derived from Those Loans 
During the past two decades, and especially between 2000 and 2007, 
LCFIs helped to generate an enormous credit boom that set the stage for 
                                                                                                                       
 31. Id. at 80; see also 2010 Zandi Testimony, supra note 1, at 10 (explaining that the 
threat of widespread defaults on CRE loans was causing many banks to “tighten lending 
standards, to the detriment of their small business customers” because “more than a third 
[of U.S. banks] had commercial mortgage loans outstanding worth more than 200% of 
their equity capital”). 
 32. February 2010 COP Report, supra note 28, at 6. 
 33. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Q. Banking Profile, 4th Qtr. 2009, 17 tbl.II-B (showing 
that 165 FDIC-insured institutions, with $540 billion of assets, failed during 2008 and 
2009, while 702 additional institutions, with $400 billion of assets, were on the FDIC’s 
list of “problem institutions” at the end of 2009); Stephen Bernard, FDIC Shuts Down 
Banks in Nevada and Washington, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Feb. 27, 2010 (report-
ing that 22 additional banks failed during the first two months of 2010, and “[t]he pace of 
bank seizures this year is likely to accelerate in coming months, FDIC officials said”). 
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the current financial crisis. LCFIs adopted what appeared to be an “origi-
nate to distribute” (“OTD”) strategy based on the techniques of securiti-
zation. Securitization enabled LCFIs to earn large amounts of fee income 
by originating high-risk loans (including nonprime residential mortgages, 
credit card loans, commercial mortgages, and LBO loans) and pooling 
those loans to create structured-finance securities. Securitization also 
allowed LCFIs—with the blessing of regulators—to reduce their capital 
requirements and offload much of their apparent credit risk.34 LCFIs con-
structed structured-finance securities that typically included senior, mez-
zanine and junior (or equity) “tranches.” Those tranches represented a 
hierarchy of rights (along a scale from the most senior to the most subor-
dinated) to receive cash flows produced by the pooled loans. LCFIs mar-
keted the tranches to satisfy the demands of various types of investors for 
different combinations of yield and risk. Structured-finance securities 
included (1) asset-backed securities (“ABS”), which represented interests 
in pools of credit card loans, auto loans, student loans and other consum-
er loans; (2) residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”), which 
represented interests in pools of residential mortgages; and (3) commer-
cial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”), which represented interests 
in pools of commercial mortgages.35 
LCFIs created “second-level securitizations” by bundling tranches of 
ABS and MBS into cash flow collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), 
and they similarly packaged syndicated LBO loans into collateralized 
loan obligations (“CLOs”).36 LCFIs also created third-level securitiza-
                                                                                                                       
 34. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 984–87, 994–97, 1008–43; see also id. at 995 (noting 
that “[f]ee income at the largest U.S. banks (including BofA, Chase and Citigroup) rose 
from 40% of total earnings in 1995 to 76% of total earnings in 2007”); Viral V. Acharya 
& Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 198–200 
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1514984; Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Philip-
pon, Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini, Prologue: A Bird’s-Eye View: The Finan-
cial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: 
HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 14–23 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 
2009). 
 35. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 984–90; see also Joshua Coval et al., The Economics 
of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 5–7 (2009); Efraim Benmelech & 
Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis 3–6, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 15045, 2009); Kenneth E. Scott, The Financial Crisis: Causes and Les-
sons: Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them, Part I – The Crisis 6–8 (Rock 
Center for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Ser. No. 67, 2009). RMBS and CMBS are 
sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as “mortgage-backed securities” (“MBS”). 
 36. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 990–91. The term “CDOs” is generally used to refer 
collectively to CDOs and CLOs as well as collateralized bond obligations (CBOs). 
STOWELL, supra note 10, at 105–06, 456. Frank Partnoy has noted that many CDOs func-
tioned as “‘second-level’ securitizations of ‘first-level’ mortgage-backed securities 
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tions by assembling pools of tranches from cash flow CDOs to construct 
“CDOs-squared.”37 The International Monetary Fund has estimated that 
private-sector financial institutions issued about $15 trillion of ABS, 
MBS, and CDOs in global markets between 2000 and 2007, including $9 
trillion issued in the U.S.38 Another study determined that $11 trillion of 
structured-finance securities were outstanding in the U.S. market in 
2008.39 
LCFIs intensified the risks of securitization by writing over-the-
counter (“OTC”) credit derivatives known as “credit default swaps” 
(“CDS”), which provided “the equivalent of insurance against default 
events” that might occur with reference to loans in securitized pools or 
tranches of ABS, MBS and CDOs.40 While CDS could be used for hedg-
ing purposes, financial institutions and other investors increasingly used 
CDS to speculate on the default risks of securitized loans and structured-
finance securities.41 LCFIs further increased the financial system’s ag-
                                                                                                                       
(which were securitizations of mortgages).” Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit 
Ratings was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 5 (U. San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 09-015, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653. CDOs 
consisting of tranches of MBS are sometimes referred to as collateralized mortgage obli-
gations (CMOs) but are referred to herein as CDOs. Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 
35, at 6. 
 37. LCFIs typically used mezzanine tranches of CDOs to create CDOs-squared, be-
cause the mezzanine tranches were the least attractive (in terms of their risk-yield tra-
deoff) to most investors. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 990–91, 1027–30; see also Scott, 
supra note 35, at 7–8, 8 slide 3. CDOs and CDOs-squared are sometimes hereinafter 
collectively referred to as “CDOs.” 
 38. October 2009 IMF GFS Report, supra note 5, at 84, fig.2.2 & fig.2.3 (indicating 
that $15.3 trillion of “private-label” issues of ABS, MBS, CDOs and CDOs-squared were 
issued in global markets between 2000 and 2007, of which $9.4 trillion was issued in the 
U.S.). “Private-label” securitizations refer to asset-backed securities issued by private-
sector financial institutions, in contrast to securitizations created by government-
sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) such as Fannie Mae (“Fannie”) and Freddie Mac (“Fred-
die”). Id. at 77; see also Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 988–89. 
 39. Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 1. 
 40. Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Ap-
proach for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1036–37 (2009); see 
also Viral V. Acharya et al., Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives, in RESTORING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 254 (Viral V. Acharya & Mat-
thew Richardson eds., 2009) (explaining that “a [CDS] is like an insurance contract”); 
Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 991–93, 1031–32. 
 41. James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical As-
sessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 569 (2009) 
(citing (i) a 2007 report by Fitch Ratings, concluding that “58% of banks that buy and sell 
credit derivatives acknowledged that ‘trading’ or gambling is their ‘dominant’ motivation 
for operating in this market, whereas less than 30% said that ‘hedging/credit risk man-
agement’ was their primary motive,” and (ii) a statement by New York superintendent of 
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gregate exposure to the risks of securitized loans by using pools of CDS 
to construct synthetic CDOs. Synthetic CDOs were generally constructed 
to mimic the performance of cash flow CDOs, and synthetic CDOs is-
sued yet another series of tranched, structured-finance securities to inves-
tors.42 By 2007, the total notional amounts of CDS and synthetic CDOs 
written with reference to securitized loans, ABS, MBS or cash flow 
CDOs may have exceeded $15 trillion.43 
Thus, based on available estimates, approximately $25 trillion of struc-
tured-finance securities and related derivatives were outstanding in the 
U.S. financial markets at the peak of the credit boom in 2007.44 Eighteen 
giant LCFIs, including ten U.S. and eight foreign financial institutions 
(the “big eighteen LCFIs”), originated the lion’s share of those complex 
instruments.45 Structured-finance securities and related derivatives not 
                                                                                                                       
insurance Eric Dinallo, concluding that “80% of the estimated $62 trillion in CDS out-
standing in 2008 were speculative”); Manns, supra note 40, at 1036–37 (noting the use of 
CDS as “speculative instruments”); Michael Lewis, Betting on the Blind Side, VANITY 
FAIR, April 2010 (explaining that “[i]n the beginning, credit-default swaps had been a 
tool for hedging . . . . Very quickly, however, the new derivatives became tools for specu-
lation”). 
 42. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 993–94, 1030–32. 
 43. Id. at 993–94, 1030–32 (citing estimates indicating that, at the peak of the credit 
boom, $1.25 to $6 trillion of synthetic CDOs were outstanding and that one-third of the 
$45 trillion of outstanding CDS were written to protect holders of CDOs, CLOs and other 
structured-finance instruments). 
 44. See supra notes 38–39, 43 and accompanying text. 
 45. During the credit boom that led to the financial crisis, the 18 leading LCFIs in 
global and U.S. markets for securities underwriting, securitizations, structured-finance 
products, and OTC derivatives included the four largest U.S. banks (BofA, Chase, Citi-
group and Wachovia), the five largest U.S. securities firms (Bear, Goldman, Lehman 
Brothers, Merrill and Morgan Stanley), the largest U.S. insurer (AIG), and eight foreign 
universal banks (Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche, HSBC, RBS, Société 
Générale and UBS). See Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 980–84, 989–90, 994–95, 1019–20, 
1031–33; see also Dwight Jaffee et al., Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the 
Financial Crisis, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 
61, 69 tbl.1.4 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (showing that 11 of 
those 18 LCFIs ranked among the top 12 global underwriters of CDOs between 2004 and 
2008); Anthony Saunders, Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Enhanced Regulation of Large, 
Complex Financial Institutions, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A 
FAILED SYSTEM 139, 142 tbl.5.2 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) 
(showing that all of the foregoing 18 LCFIs, except for AIG, ranked among the top 23 
global providers of wholesale financial services in 2006 and 2007). In Wilmarth, supra 
note 1, at 994–95, I mistakenly omitted UBS from the list of leading LCFIs during the 
credit boom. UBS clearly belonged on that list, as shown at id. at 980–82, 989–90, 1019 
n.280, 1032–33; see also Jaffee et al., supra, at 69 tbl.1.4 (listing UBS among the top 12 
global underwriters of CDOs between 2004 and 2007); Saunders, Smith & Walter, supra, 
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only financed, but also far exceeded, about $9 trillion of risky private-
sector debt that was outstanding in U.S. financial markets when the cre-
dit crisis broke out.46 The combined volume of MBS, cash flow CDOs, 
CDS, and synthetic CDOs created an “inverted pyramid of risk,” which 
enabled investors to place “multiple layers of financial bets” on the per-
formance of high-risk loans in securitized pools.47 Consequently, when 
the underlying loans began to default, the leverage inherent in this “py-
ramid of risk” produced losses that were far larger than the face amounts 
of the defaulted loans.48 
2. LCFIs Pressured Credit Ratings Agencies to Provide “AAA” Ratings 
to Promote the Sale of Risky Structured-Finance Securities 
In view of the risks embodied in structured-finance securities, why did 
investors buy them? LCFIs made the securities attractive to investors by 
paying large fees to credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) in order to secure 
investment-grade ratings (BBB- and above) for most tranches of those 
securities. Many institutional investors (including banks and insurance 
companies) are obligated by law or contract to invest solely in securities 
that carry investment-grade ratings, and only a handful of CRAs possess 
the “regulatory imprimatur” to issue such ratings.49 
                                                                                                                       
at 142 tbl.5.2 (showing that UBS was one of the eight largest global providers of whole-
sale financial services in 2006 and 2007). 
 46. About $6.3 trillion of nonprime residential mortgage loans, credit card loans, and 
CRE loans were outstanding in the U.S. market in 2008, of which about $2.8 trillion was 
held in securitized pools and other loans were referenced by CDS. See Wilmarth, supra 
note 1, at 988–94, 1024–41. In addition, about $2.5 trillion of LBO loans and high-yield 
(“junk”) bonds were outstanding in the U.S. market in 2008, and a significant portion of 
that debt was securitized or referenced by CDS. Id. at 1039–43; see also CHARLES R. 
MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE 
GREAT CREDIT CRASH 123–26, 134–39 (2d ed. 2008). 
 47. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 991–94, 1027–32. 
 48. See MORRIS, supra note 46, at 73–79, 113–14, 123–32; Michael Lewis, The End, 
PORTFOLIO.COM (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-
news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom/?print=true” (quoting hedge 
fund manager Steve Eisman, who explained that Wall Street firms built an “engine of 
doom” with cash flow CDOs and synthetic CDOs, because those instruments created 
“several towers of debt” on top of “the original subprime loans,” and “that’s why the 
losses are so much greater than the loans”). 
 49. Manns, supra note 40, at 1050–52; see also STOWELL, supra note 10, at 105–06, 
125–28; Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies 
in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 244–46 (2009); 
Matthew Richardson & Lawrence J. White, The Ratings Agencies: Is Regulation the An-
swer?, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 101, 101–
05 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009); Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra 
note 35, at 3–4; Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An 
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CRAs charge fees for their ratings based on an “issuer pays” business 
model, which requires an issuer of securities to pay fees to one or more 
CRAs in order to secure credit ratings for its securities. The “issuer pays” 
model creates an obvious conflict of interest between a CRA’s desire to 
earn fees from issuers of securities and the CRA’s stake in preserving its 
reputation for making reliable risk assessments. Structured-finance secu-
ritizations heightened this conflict of interest because LCFIs often paid 
additional consulting fees to obtain CRAs’ advice on how to structure 
securitizations to produce the maximum percentage of AAA-rated securi-
ties.50 Moreover, a small group of LCFIs dominated the securitization 
markets and were therefore significant repeat players in those markets. 
As a result, LCFIs could strongly influence a CRA’s decision on whether 
to assign favorable ratings to an issue of structured-finance securities by 
threatening to seek higher ratings from other CRAs for the same issue.51 
Moody’s, one of the two leading CRAs, reported the highest profit 
margin of any company included in the S&P 500 index for five consecu-
tive years during the early 2000s, while S&P, the other top CRA, “was 
similarly profitable.”52 Moody’s generated almost half of its total reve-
                                                                                                                       
Institutional Investor Perspective 4–6 (U. San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 09-014,2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608. 
 50. For discussion of the conflicts of interest created by the CRAs’ “issuer pays” 
model, see, for example, Lynch, supra note 49, at 246–48, 256–61; Manns, supra note 
40, at 1052; Partnoy, supra note 36, at 3–7; David Reiss, Rating Agencies and Reputa-
tional Risk 4–8 (Brook. L. Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 136, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358316. An investigative report issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 2008 discussed the CRAs’ conflicts of interest and 
quoted an email message sent by a CRA manager to a colleague on December 15, 2006. 
After complaining that CRAs were making the CDO market an “even bigger monster,” 
the CRA manager remarked, “Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this 
house of cards falters.” Lynch, supra note 49, at 258–60 (summarizing SEC report and 
quoting CRA manager’s email message); see also Aaron Luchetti, S&P Email: ‘We 
Should Not Be Rating It’, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2008, at B1 (reporting that the quoted 
email message was sent by an analytical manager at Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”), while 
an S&P staffer stated in another email message that “we rate every deal” and “it could be 
structured by cows and we would rate it”). 
 51. Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 16–21, 25 (providing evidence of “rat-
ing shopping” by issuers of structured-finance securities); Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A 
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, (Magazine), at 36; see also Lynch, supra note 49, at 
256–58 (stating that a Wall Street Journal article and the SEC’s 2008 investigative report 
on CRAs indicated that “the credit rating agencies were captured by MBS issuers and 
bent to the pressures inherent in the issuer-pays business model”); Wilmarth, supra note 
1, at 988–94, 1011–12, 1017–20, 1027–42 (describing how a small group of LCFIs 
achieved dominance over the securitization markets). 
 52. Partnoy, supra note 49, at 5.  
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nues from rating structured-finance products during 2005 and 2006.53 
Given the generous fees CRAs received from LCFIs for rating struc-
tured-finance securities, it is not surprising that CRAs typically assigned 
AAA ratings to three-quarters or more of the tranches of ABS, RMBS, 
CDOs and CDOs-squared.54 
Investors relied heavily on credit ratings and usually did not perform 
any meaningful due diligence before deciding to buy structured-finance 
securities. SEC regulations allowed issuers to sell ABS, RMBS and 
CDOs to investors based on very limited disclosures beyond the instru-
ments’ credit ratings.55 In addition, the complexity of structured-finance 
transactions made it difficult for investors to evaluate the risks of first-
level securitizations and nearly impossible for investors to ascertain the 
risks of second- and third-level securitizations.56 
Investors also had strong incentives not to question the ratings as-
signed to structured-finance securities by CRAs. AAA-rated structured-
finance securities paid yields that were significantly higher than other 
AAA-rated securities.57 Structured-finance securities were therefore very 
                                                                                                                       
 53. Coval et al., supra note 35, at 4–5; Crotty, supra note 41, at 566. 
 54. See Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1028–29; Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 
4 (stating that “[a] common feature of all structured finance deals, regardless of the type 
of underlying collateral, is that a large share of the securities issued (typically 70-85%) 
are carved out as AAA”); see also Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 73–74 (showing that a 
typical securitization of subprime mortgages, followed by the creation of two cash flow 
CDOs and a CDO-squared, would produce an array of tranches of which more than 90% 
were rated AAA); cf. Coval et al., supra note 35, at 4 (stating that three-fifths of all out-
standing issues of structured-finance products in 2007 carried AAA ratings, compared to 
less than one percent of outstanding issues of corporate debt). 
 55. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2070–73 (2007) (discussing 
limited disclosures given to institutional investors who bought structured-finance securi-
ties in private placements under SEC Rule 144A); Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized 
Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulations Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, 
and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1360–62, 1373–87 (2009) (discussing addi-
tional reasons why SEC regulations failed to require adequate disclosures for offerings of 
CDOs and instead encouraged investors to rely on credit ratings). 
 56. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1026–28; Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 73–74; Scott, 
supra note 35, at 7–8, 16; October 2009 IMF GFS Report, supra note 5, at 81. 
 57. AAA-rated structured finance securities paid higher yields than AAA-rated corpo-
rate bonds because they represented interests in large, diversified pools of risky loans 
and, therefore, were exposed to “enormous systematic risk” in the event of “large de-
clines in the aggregate economy.” Coval et al., supra note 35, at 17–19 (quotes at 18). 
Structured-finance securities offered “payoffs essentially identical to a derivative security 
written against a broad economic index,” and securities with “[s]uch a risk profile should 
be expected to earn a higher rate of return than those available from single-name bonds, 
whose defaults are affected by firm-specific bad luck.” Id. at 18; see also Wilmarth, su-
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attractive to investors who were seeking the highest available yields on 
“safe” debt securities during the low-interest, low-inflation environment 
of the pre-crisis period.58 
Thus, the investment-grade credit ratings issued by CRAs enabled 
LCFIs to transform “trillions of dollars of risky assets . . . into securities 
that were widely considered to be safe . . . [and] were eagerly bought up 
by investors around the world.”59 LCFIs exploited the conflicts of inter-
est inherent in the “issuer pays” model by paying copious fees that per-
suaded CRAs to “turn[] a blind eye” to the risks underlying structured-
finance securities.60 As a practical matter, LCFIs induced CRAs to issue 
corrupt ratings for structured-finance securities in much the same way 
that LCFIs had previously bribed and bullied in-house research analysts 
to provide corrupt recommendations to support dotcom and telecom 
stocks that LCFIs underwrote during the stock market boom of the late 
1990s.61 
Given the CRAs’ pervasive conflicts of interest, it is not surprising that 
their credit ratings misrepresented the true risks embedded in structured-
finance securities. CRAs, like the LCFI issuers, either knowingly or 
recklessly made critical misjudgments by (i) giving too much weight to 
                                                                                                                       
pra note 1, at 1028 (noting that “AAA-rated senior tranches of RMBS . . . offered signifi-
cantly higher yields than other types of AAA-rated investments and carried the same 
imprimatur from the [CRAs]”). 
 58. See Coval et al., supra note 35, at 4, 19; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1028–29; 
October 2009 IMF GFS Report, supra note 5, at 81; Acharya & Richardson, supra note 
34, at 205 (stating that, in June 2006, “AAA-rated tranches of subprime CDOs offered 
twice the premium of the typical AAA credit-default swap of a corporation”); U.K. FIN. 
SERV. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING 
CRISIS 12–15 (March 2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW] (ex-
plaining that LCFIs created novel types of securitized credit instruments to satisfy “a 
ferocious search for yield” by investors in the context of “very low medium- and long-
term real interest rates”); Mark Astley et al., Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis 
178, 181, BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL., Q3, 2009, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478419 (concluding that “[t]he low 
interest rate environment seems to have interacted with strong competitive pressures on 
banks and asset managers to maintain returns, leading to a ‘search for yield’ in financial 
markets”) (footnote omitted). 
 59. Coval et al., supra note 35, at 3–4. 
 60. Manns, supra note 40, at 1043; see also Lynch, supra note 49, at 258–60; Manns, 
supra note 40, at 1041–47, 1052–53; Reiss, supra note 50, at 4–8. 
 61. FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 274–91 (2003); Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1000. For a comprehen-
sive journalistic account of the research analyst scandal, see CHARLES GASPARINO, BLOOD 
ON THE STREET: THE SENSATIONAL INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET ANALYSTS 
DUPED A GENERATION OF INVESTORS (2005). 
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the benefits of diversification from pooling large numbers of high-risk 
loans, (ii) failing to recognize that RMBS and CDOs became more risky 
as mortgage lending standards deteriorated between 2004 and 2007, (iii) 
failing to appreciate that RMBS and CDOs often contained dangerous 
concentrations of loans from high-risk states like California, (iv) unde-
restimating the risk that a serious economic downturn would trigger 
widespread correlated defaults among pooled loans of similar types, (v) 
relying on historical data drawn from a relatively brief period in which 
benign economic conditions prevailed, and (vi) assuming that housing 
prices would never decline on a nationwide basis.62 By mid-2009, CRAs 
had cut their ratings on tens of thousands of investment-grade tranches of 
RMBS and CDOs, and securitization markets had collapsed.63 
3. LCFIs Promoted an Unsustainable Credit Boom that Set the Stage for 
the Financial Crisis 
The LCFIs’ large-scale securitizations of credit helped to create an 
enormous credit boom in the U.S. financial markets between 1991 and 
2007. Nominal domestic private-sector debt nearly tripled, rising from 
$10.3 trillion to $39.9 trillion during that period, and the largest increases 
occurred in the financial and household sectors.64 Total domestic private-
sector debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (“GDP”) rose from 
150 percent in 1987 to almost 300 percent in 2007 and, by that measure, 
exceeded even the huge credit boom that led to the Great Depression.65 
                                                                                                                       
 62. See Coval et al., supra note 35, at 3–4, 8–21; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1034; 
Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 2, 13–15, 21–23, 25; Partnoy, supra note 36, at 
6–11; Lowenstein, supra note 51. 
 63. October 2009 IMF GFS Report, supra note 5, at 93 fig.2.12 (reporting that, as of 
June 30, 2009, S&P had (i) cut its ratings on 90% of AAA-rated tranches of ABS CDOs 
issued from 2005 to 2007, and 80% of those tranches were reduced to noninvestment-
grade ratings of BB or lower, and (ii) lowered its ratings on 63% of AAA-rated tranches 
of private-label RMBS issued during the same period, and 52% of those tranches were 
reduced to noninvestment-grade ratings); Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 35, at 8–9, 
31 tbl.2 (reporting that Moody’s issued 45,000 downgrades affecting 36,000 tranches of 
structured-finance securities during 2007 and the first nine months of 2008, and Moody’s 
average downgrade during that period was 5.2 rating notches). 
 64. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1002 & nn.174–76 (reporting that financial sector debt 
accounted for $13 trillion of the increase in domestic nongovernmental debt between 
1991 and 2007, while household debt grew by $10 trillion and nonfinancial business debt 
increased by $6.4 trillion). 
 65. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 58, at 18 exh. 1.10; see also STOWELL, supra note 
10, at 456 exh.3 (showing the rapid growth of total domestic nongovernmental debt as a 
percentage of GDP between the mid-1980s and the end of 2007); Wilmarth, supra note 1, 
at 974, 974 n.26 (referring to the credit boom of the 1920s that precipitated the Great 
Depression). 
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Financial sector debt as a percentage of GDP rose from 40 percent in 
1988 to 70 percent in 1998 and 120 percent in 2008.66 Meanwhile, 
household sector debt grew from two-thirds of GDP in the early 1990s to 
100 percent of GDP in 2008.67 
The credit boom produced a surge in profits and employee compensa-
tion in the financial sector, and it greatly enhanced the financial sector’s 
importance within the broader economy. “From 1996 through 2006, 
profits at financial companies rose an average of 13.8% per year, com-
pared with 8.5% for nonfinancial companies.”68 Financial sector earnings 
doubled as a share of total corporate pretax profits between 1980 and 
2007, rising from thirteen to twenty-seven percent of such profits.69 Dur-
ing the same period, the compensation gap between financial sector em-
ployees and other workers grew from ten percent to fifty percent.70 
Stocks of financial firms included in the S&P 500 index held the highest 
aggregate market value of any sector of that index from 1995 to 1998, 
and again from 2002 to 2007.71 
As the credit book inflated and the financial sector grew in size and 
importance to the overall economy, LCFIs also became more leveraged, 
more fragile, and more vulnerable to a systemic crisis. At the end of 
2007, the ten largest U.S. financial institutions—all of which were lead-
ing participants in structured-finance securitization—had an average le-
verage ratio of 27:1 when their off-balance-sheet (“OBS”) commitments 
                                                                                                                       
 66. The Gods Strike Back: A Special Report on Financial Risk, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 
2010, at 3, chart 1. 
 67. Peter Coy, Why the Fed Isn’t Igniting Inflation, BUS. WEEK, June 29, 2009, at 20, 
21; see also supra n.22 (reporting that the ratio of U.S. household debt to disposable per-
sonal income increased from 87% in 1990 to 139% in 2007). 
 68. Tom Lauricella, Crumbling Profit Center: Financial Sector Showing Life, but 
Don’t Bank on Long-Term Revival, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2008, at C1; see also HENRY 
KAUFMAN, THE ROAD TO FINANCIAL REFORMATION: WARNINGS, CONSEQUENCES, 
REFORMS 161 (2010) (stating that financial sector profits increased by 313% between 
1995 and 2007, compared to a 197% profit rise for nonfinancial businesses). 
 69. Justin Lahart, Has the Financial Industry’s Heyday Come and Gone?, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 28, 2008, at A2; see also Buttonwood, The Profits Puzzle, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 
2007, at 99 (reporting that the financial sector contributed “around 27% of the profits 
made by companies in the S&P 500 index [in 2007], up from 19% in 1996”). 
 70. Lahart, supra note 69. 
 71. Elizabeth Stanton, Bank Stocks Cede Biggest S&P Weighting to Technology (Up-
date 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, May 21, 2008; see also Lauricella, supra note 68 (reporting 
that financial stocks accounted for 22.3% of the value of all stocks included in the S&P 
index at the end of 2006, “up from just 13% at the end of 1995”). 
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were taken into account.72 James Crotty has summarized the parallel de-
velopment of financial growth, leverage and fragility as follows: 
Over time, financial markets grew ever larger relative to the nonfinan-
cial economy, important financial products became more complex, 
opaque and illiquid, and system-wide leverage exploded. As a result, 
financial crises became more threatening. This process culminated in 
the current crisis, which is so severe that it has pushed the global econ-
omy to the brink of depression.73 
As I noted in a previous article, “[b]y 2007, the health of the U.S. 
economy relied on a massive confidence game—indeed, some might say, 
a Ponzi scheme—operated by its leading financial institutions.”74 This 
“confidence game,” which sustained the credit boom, could continue on-
ly as long as investors were willing “to keep buying new debt instru-
ments that would enable overstretched borrowers to expand their con-
sumption and service their debts.”75 In the summer of 2007, when inves-
tors lost confidence in the ability of subprime borrowers to meet their 
obligations, “the game collapsed and a severe financial crisis began.”76 
B. LCFIs Retained Exposures to Many of the Hazards Embedded in 
Their High-Risk Lending 
During the credit boom, LCFIs pursued a securitization strategy that 
produced highly leveraged risk-taking through the use of complex struc-
tured-finance products, CDS, and OBS vehicles.77 This securitization 
strategy was highly attractive in the short term, because LCFIs (as well 
                                                                                                                       
 72. See KAUFMAN, supra note 68, at 105 exh.8.4 (providing the total assets, OBS 
commitments and shareholders’ equity for each of the 10 largest U.S. financial institu-
tions—Citigroup, BofA, Chase, Morgan Stanley, Merrill, Wells Fargo, AIG, Goldman 
and Lehman—at the end of 2007). I calculated the leverage ratio for each of the 10 LCFIs 
by (i) combining the total assets and OBS commitments of each LCFI and (ii) dividing 
the combined number by the LCFI’s shareholders’ equity. See infra notes 90–99 and 
accompanying text (explaining how LCFIs used OBS vehicles to increase their leverage). 
 73. Crotty, supra note 41, at 564; see also TURNER REVIEW, supra note 58, at 19 (ob-
serving that “[t]he growing size of the financial sector was accompanied by an increase in 
total system leverage which . . . played an important role in driving the boom and in 
creating vulnerabilities that have increased the severity of the crisis”) (footnote omitted). 
 74. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1008 (footnote omitted). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, How Banks Played the Leverage Game, in 
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 83, 83–89 (Viral V. 
Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009); Blundell-Wignall et al., supra note 4, at 3–
13; Saunders, Smith & Walter, supra note 45, at 140–45; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 
1027–41. 
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as the mortgage brokers, nonbank lenders and CRAs who worked with 
LCFIs) collected lucrative fees at each stage of originating, securitizing, 
rating and marketing the risky residential mortgages, commercial mort-
gages, credit card loans and LBO loans.78 Based on the widespread belief 
that LCFIs were following an OTD strategy, both managers and regula-
tors of LCFIs operated under the illusion that the credit risks inherent in 
the securitized loans were being transferred to the ultimate purchasers of 
structured-finance securities.79 In significant ways, however, LCFIs ac-
tually pursued an originate to not really distribute program.80 
For example, LCFIs decided to keep large amounts of highly-rated, 
structured-finance securities on their balance sheets because regulators 
allowed LCFIs to do so with a minimum of capital. In the U.S., LCFIs 
took advantage of a regulation issued by the federal banking agencies in 
November 2001, which greatly reduced the risk-based capital charge for 
structured-finance securities rated “AAA” or “AA” by CRAs. The 2001 
regulation assigned a risk weighting of only twenty percent to such se-
curities in determining the amount of risk-based capital that banks were 
required to hold.81 As a practical matter, the 2001 rule cut the risk-based 
capital requirement for highly-rated tranches of RMBS and related CDOs 
from four percent to only 1.6 percent.82 The federal agencies adopted the 
2001 rule even though commentators at the proposal stage warned that 
CRAs faced “an inherent conflict of interest” in rating structured-finance 
securities because the bank issuers would be “paying for the rating[s].”83 
In Europe, LCFIs similarly retained AAA-rated structured-finance se-
curities on their balance sheets because the Basel I and Basel II capital 
accords assigned very low risk weights to such securities. In contrast to 
the U.S., European nations did not require banks to maintain a minimum 
leverage capital ratio and instead required banks only to meet the Basel 
                                                                                                                       
 78. Crotty, supra note 41, at 565–66; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 984–87, 995–96, 
1017–20, 1034–42. 
 79. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 995–96, 1030. 
 80. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 34, at 198–201; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 
970–71, 1032–35, 1039–43, 1046–48; TURNER REVIEW, supra note 58, at 15–21. 
 81. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 59614, 59625-27 (Nov. 29, 
2001) [hereinafter 2001 Risk-Based Capital Rule]; Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in 
Mind: A History of Policies that Produced the Financial Crisis of 2008 at 25–26 (Sept. 
15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474430. 
 82. Kling, supra note 81, at 25 fig.4. 
 83. 2001 Risk-Based Capital Rule, supra note 81, at 59265 (noting statements by 
“[s]everal commenters” who responded to the proposed rule by warning that the reliabili-
ty of ratings would be undermined by conflicts of interest at CRAs); Kling, supra note 
81, at 25–26; see also supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts of 
interest created by the “issuer pays” business model adopted by CRAs). 
730 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
risk-weighted capital standards. As a result, European banks did not in-
cur significant capital charges for holding on-balance-sheet, AAA-rated 
instruments due to their low risk weights under Basel rules.84 
LCFIs had other reasons to retain highly-rated structured finance se-
curities on their balance sheets. As the credit boom reached its peak, 
LCFIs found it difficult to locate investors to purchase all of the AAA 
tranches they were producing. Managers at aggressive LCFIs decided to 
assume “warehouse risk” by keeping AAA-rated tranches on their bal-
ance sheets, because they wanted to complete more securitization deals, 
earn more fees, produce higher short-term profits and distribute larger 
compensation packages to executives and key employees.85 In addition, 
several LCFIs engaged in “negative basis trades” (“NBTs”) by purchas-
ing AAA-rated tranches and selling CDS on the same instruments to ei-
ther AIG or monoline insurance companies. LCFIs used aggressive ac-
counting techniques to book an immediate profit on each NBT in an 
amount equal to the estimated present value of the difference between (i) 
the expected revenues to be received from the AAA-rated tranches dur-
ing the term of the NBT and (ii) the premiums to be paid on the CDS 
during that period (usually five to ten years).86 The promise of near-term 
                                                                                                                       
 84. For discussion of the liberal treatment of AAA-rated securities under the Basel 
accords, see Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 77, at 94–98; Andrew G. Haldane, Banking 
on the State, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS REVIEW 5–8 (Nov. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/r091111e.pdf. Because European banks did not have to comp-
ly with a minimum leverage capital ratio, the 13 largest European banks operated in 2008 
with an average leverage ratio of 2.68%, compared to an average leverage ratio of 5.88% 
for the ten largest U.S. banks (which were required to maintain a leverage capital ratio of 
at least 4%). Similarly, the four largest U.S. securities firms had an average leverage ratio 
of only 3.33%, because the SEC did not require those firms to comply with a minimum 
leverage ratio. Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, The Sub-prime Crisis: Causal 
Distortions and Regulatory Reform, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL OF 2007 
AND 2008: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON 14-15 JULY 2008 55, 93–94, 95 tbl.6 (Paul 
Bloxham & Christopher Kent eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2008/conf-vol-2008.pdf; McCoy et al., supra 
note 9, at 1358–60 (explaining that the SEC exempted the five largest U.S. investment 
banks from the SEC’s net capital rule in 2004 and allowed them to determine their capital 
requirements based on internal risk models, with the result that leverage at the five firms 
increased to about 30:1 by 2008). 
 85. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1032–33; see also Gian Luca Clementi et al., Rethink-
ing Compensation in Financial Firms, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO 
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 197, 198–200 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 
2009); Crotty, supra note 41, at 568–69; Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 71–73. 
 86. For discussion of negative basis trades, see Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1033 
n.355; David Henry & Matthew Goldstein, Death of a Bond Insurer, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 
14, 2008, at 24, 25–26; Serena Ng & Susan Pulliam, The Bond ‘Transformers’: Regula-
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profits from fees and NBTs blinded LCFIs to the risk that AIG and mo-
noline insurers might default on their CDS obligations.87 
By 2007, Citigroup, Merrill, and UBS together held more than $175 
billion of AAA-rated CDOs on their books.88 The huge losses suffered 
by those institutions on retained CDO exposures were a significant rea-
son why all three needed extensive governmental assistance to avoid 
failure.89 
In addition, LCFIs retained risk exposures for many of the assets they 
ostensibly transferred to OBS entities through securitization. Regulators 
in the U.S. and Europe allowed LCFIs to sponsor structured investment 
vehicles (“SIVs”) and other OBS conduits, which were frequently used 
as dumping grounds for the RMBS and CDOs that LCFIs were unable to 
sell to arms-length investors. The sponsored conduits sold asset-backed 
commercial paper (“ABCP”) to investors (including MMMFs) and used 
the proceeds to buy structured-finance securities originated by the spon-
soring LCFIs. The conduits faced a potentially dangerous funding mis-
match between their longer-term, structured-finance assets and their 
shorter-term, ABCP liabilities. The sponsoring LCFIs covered that mis-
match (in whole or in part) by providing explicit credit enhancements 
(including lines of credit) or implicit commitments to ensure the availa-
bility of liquidity if the sponsored conduits could not roll over their 
ABCP.90 
U.S. regulators adopted capital rules that encouraged the use of ABCP 
conduits. Those rules did not assess any capital charges against LCFIs 
for transferring securitized assets to sponsored conduits, but instead, re-
quired LCFIs to post capital only if they provided explicit credit en-
                                                                                                                       
tors Revisit a Loophole Allowing Insurers to Do Swaps, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2008, at 
C1. 
 87. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
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127–28, 134, 138, 216–17 (2009); Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1031–35 (noting that AIG 
and monoline insurers wrote about $1 trillion of CDS with respect to structured-finance 
securities); Henry & Goldstein, supra note 86; Ng & Pulliam, supra note 86 (noting that 
“[f]or Wall Street firms, the bond insurers’ willingness to sell [CDS] was a potential bo-
nanza” that “benefited the banks by freeing capital . . . [and] enabled the banks to book 
sizable profits upfront”). 
 88. Clementi et al., supra note 85, at 198–200. 
 89. TETT, supra note 87, at 133–39, 204–06; Blundell-Wignall et al., supra note 4, at 
4, 7–11; Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 68–69, 72–73; infra notes 118–119 and accompa-
nying text. 
 90. For discussion of the risk exposures of LCFIs to SIVs and other sponsored con-
duits, see TETT, supra note 87, at 97–98, 127–28, 136, 196–98; Acharya & Schnabl, su-
pra note 77, at 88–94; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1033. 
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hancements to their conduits.91 Moreover, a 2004 regulation approved a 
very low capital charge for sponsors’ lines of credit, equal to only one-
tenth of the usual capital charge of eight percent, as long as the lines of 
credit had maturities of one year or less.92 
ABCP conduits sponsored by LCFIs grew rapidly during the peak 
years of the credit boom. As a result, the ABCP market in the United 
States nearly doubled after 2003 and reached $1.2 trillion in August 
2007. Three-quarters of that amount was held in 300 conduits sponsored 
by U.S. and European LCFIs.93 Citigroup was the largest conduit spon-
sor, and seven of the top ten sponsors were members of the “big eigh-
teen” club of LCFIs.94 As a result of their risk exposures to conduits and 
their other OBS commitments, many of the leading LCFIs were much 
more highly leveraged than their balance sheets indicated.95 
After the financial crisis broke out in August 2007, conduits suffered 
large losses on their holdings of structured-finance securities. Many con-
duits were unable to roll over their ABCP because investors refused to 
buy securities (like ABCP) that were exposed to potential losses from 
subprime mortgages.96 To prevent conduit defaults and avoid damage to 
their reputations, most LCFI sponsors went beyond their legal obliga-
tions and either brought conduit assets back onto their balance sheets or 
provided stronger credit enhancements that enabled conduits to remain in 
business.97 
                                                                                                                       
 91. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 77, at 89. 
 92. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 44908, 44910-11 (July 28, 2004); 
see also Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 77, at 89 (noting that capital requirements for 
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 97. Id. at 91–94; see also Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1033 (observing that the conduit 
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SIVs. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1033 n.358. 
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Thus, notwithstanding the widely-shared assumption that LCFIs were 
following an OTD strategy, they did not transfer many of the credit risks 
created by their securitization programs. Instead, “they ‘warehoused’ 
nonprime mortgage-related assets . . . [and] transferred similar assets to 
sponsored OBS entities.”98 In fact, LCFIs retained risk exposures to 
about half of the outstanding AAA-rated ABS in mid-2008 through their 
“warehoused” and OBS positions.99 In many respects, LCFIs “pursued an 
‘originate to not really distribute’ strategy, which prevented financial 
regulators and analysts from understanding the true risks created by the 
LCFIs’ involvement with nonprime mortgage-related assets.”100 
Commentators noted that the LCFIs’ use of complex derivatives and 
OBS structures resembled the abusive accounting maneuvers of Enron, 
which Congress thought it had prohibited by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in 2002.101 Indeed, many of the same LCFIs that were embroiled in 
the financial crisis had previously played major roles in structuring 
Enron’s deceptive transactions.102 Belatedly, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (“FASB”) and federal banking agencies took action 
during the past year to force banks to provide on-balance-sheet account-
ing and capital treatment for OBS entities they control.103 
                                                                                                                       
 98. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1033–34. 
 99. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 77, at 97 tbl.2.2, 97–98. 
 100. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1034. 
 101. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Why Surprises Still Lurk After Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
29, 2008, at C1; David Reilly, Look Under the Banks’ Hoods: FASB to Re-Examine 
Whether Financing Vehicles That Added to Woes Should Stay Off Books, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 29, 2008, at C1. For a description of Enron’s manipulative use of derivatives and 
OBS entities, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Gover-
nance Failures at Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The 
Cases of Enron and WorldCom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 97, 102–10 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2007). 
 102. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 999–1001; Wilmarth, supra note 101, at 101–12 (ex-
plaining the important roles played by Citigroup, Chase, Barclays, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche, RBS, Merrill Lynch. BNP Paribas and UBS in (i) structuring Enron’s abusive 
transactions and/or (ii) pressuring their in-house research analysts to provide favorable 
reports on Enron). 
 103. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 47138, 47140-41 (Sept. 15, 2009) 
(explaining that FASB had adopted new standards that would require consolidated ac-
counting treatment for all OBS “variable interest entities” (VIEs), including ABCP con-
duits, over which a bank exercises a “controlling financial interest” by reason of (i) “the 
power to direct matters that most significantly impact the activities of the VIE” or (ii) 
“either the obligation to absorb losses of the VIE that could potentially be significant to 
the VIE, or the right to receive benefits from the VIE that could potentially be significant 
to the VIE, or both”); Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. 4636, 4637–39 (Jan. 
28, 2010) (applying risk-based and leverage capital requirements to VIEs that are subject 
to consolidated accounting treatment under the FASB’s new standards). 
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C. LCFIs were Not Solely Responsible for the Financial Crisis, but They 
were the Most Important Private-Sector Catalysts for the Crisis 
Excessive risk-taking by LCFIs was not the only cause of the current 
financial crisis. Several additional factors played an important role. First, 
many analysts have criticized the FRB for maintaining an excessively 
loose monetary policy during the second half of the 1990s and again be-
tween 2001 and 2005. Critics charge that the FRB’s monetary policy 
mistakes produced speculative asset booms that led to the dotcom-
telecom bust in the stock market between 2000 and 2002 and the bursting 
of the housing bubble after 2006.104 
Second, during the past decade several Asian nations that were large 
exporters of goods (including China, Japan, and South Korea) main-
tained artificially low exchange rates for their currencies against the dol-
lar, the pound sterling, and the euro. To preserve the desired currency 
exchange rates, those nations boosted the value of Western currencies by 
purchasing Western government securities and investing in Western fi-
nancial markets. In addition, many oil exporting nations invested large 
amounts in Western assets. Thus, nations with significant balance-of-
trade surpluses provided large amounts of credit and investment capital 
that helped to promote asset booms in the U.S., the U.K., and other Eu-
ropean countries.105 
Third, Robert Shiller and others have argued that “bubble thinking” 
caused home buyers, LCFIs, CRAs, investors in structured-finance se-
curities, and regulators to believe that the housing boom would continue 
                                                                                                                       
 104. For critiques of the FRB’s monetary policy, see JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF 
TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED AND 
WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1–6, 11–13 (2009) (contending that the FRB’s “extra-
easy [monetary] policy accelerated the housing boom and thereby ultimately led to the 
housing bust”); Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1005–06 (summarizing analysis by various 
critics of the FRB); Yener Altumbas et al., Does Monetary Policy Affect Bank Risk-taking 
1, 4, 16 (Bank Int’l Settlements Working Paper No. 298, 2010), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work298.htm (determining, based on a study of performance 
data for 1,100 banks operating in the U.S. and the EU from 1998 to 2008, that “unusually 
low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to an increase in banks’ 
risk-taking”); Kling, supra note 81, at 38–39. For an impassioned attack on the FRB’s 
monetary policy between the mid-1990s and 2005, see generally WILLIAM A 
FLECKENSTEIN & FREDERICK SHEEHAN, GREENSPAN’S BUBBLES: THE AGE OF IGNORANCE 
AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2008). 
 105. For analysis of the impact of large purchases of Western government securities 
and other investments in Western financial markets by Asian nations and oil exporting 
countries, see MORRIS, supra note 46, at 88–104; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1006–07; 
Astley et al., supra note 58, at 180–82. 
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indefinitely and “could not end badly.”106 According to these analysts, a 
“social contagion of boom thinking” helps to explain both why the hous-
ing bubble continued to inflate for several years, and why regulators 
failed to stop LCFIs from making high-risk loans to borrowers who had 
no capacity to repay or refinance their loans unless their properties con-
tinued to appreciate in value.107 Failures by federal financial regulators to 
stop unsound lending and speculative risk-taking by LCFIs played a sig-
nificant role in precipitating the financial crisis.108 
Finally, Fannie Mae (“Fannie”) and Freddie Mac (“Freddie”) contri-
buted to the housing bubble by purchasing large quantities of nonprime 
mortgages and RMBS beginning in 2003. Those government-sponsored 
entities (“GSEs”) purchased nonprime mortgages and RMBS because (i) 
Congress pressured them to fulfill affordable housing goals, (ii) large 
nonprime mortgage lenders (including Countrywide) threatened to sell 
most of their mortgages to Wall Street firms if the GSEs failed to pur-
chase more of their nonprime loans, and (iii) Fannie’s and Freddie’s se-
nior executives feared the loss of additional market share to LCFIs that 
were aggressively securitizing nonprime mortgages into private-label 
RMBS. In 2007, the two GSEs held $220 billion of RMBS backed by 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages, representing a tenth of the nonprime 
market. Heavy losses on Fannie’s and Freddie’s portfolios of nonprime 
RMBS contributed to their collapse in 2008.109 
                                                                                                                       
 106. ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 48–54 (2008); see also MORRIS, 
supra note 46, at 65–69; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1007–08; Astley et al., supra note 58, 
at 181 (observing: “Financial market participants were lulled into a false sense of security 
by extrapolating only from recent benign data, thereby attaching low probabilities to 
adverse outcomes. This ‘disaster myopia’ may have contributed to the price of risk being 
set too low”) (footnote omitted). 
 107. SHILLER, supra note 106, at 41–54; see also Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1007–08, 
and sources cited therein. 
 108. For critiques of regulatory failures by the FRB, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (“OCC”), the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) and SEC, see, e.g., Oren 
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 80–95 (2008); 
McCoy et al., supra note 9, at 1343–66; Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 19–31; Neglect and 
Inaction: An Analysis of Federal Banking Regulators’ Failure to Enforce Consumer Pro-
tections (Center for Responsible Lending, CRL Policy Brief, July 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-
legislation/regulators/neglect-and-inaction-7-10-09-final.pdf. 
 109. For discussions of Fannie’s and Freddie’s purchases of nonprime RMBS and the 
reasons for such purchases, see, for example, Dwight Jaffee et al., What to Do about the 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO 
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 121, 124–30 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 
2009); Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Fo-
reclosure Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 163–168 (2009); Jo Becker et al., White 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing factors, LCFIs were clearly “the prima-
ry private-sector catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the 
subprime financial crisis, and they [became] the epicenter of the current 
global financial mess.”110 As indicated above, the big eighteen LCFIs 
were dominant players in global securities and derivatives markets dur-
ing the credit boom.111 The big eighteen LCFIs included most of the top 
underwriters for nonprime RMBS, ABS, CMBS and LBO loans as well 
as related CDOs, CLOs and CDS.112 While Fannie and Freddie funded 
about one-tenth of the nonprime mortgage market between 2003 and 
2007, they did so primarily by purchasing RMBS that were underwritten 
by LCFIs.113 LCFIs provided most of the rest of the funding for non-
prime mortgages, as well as much of the financing for risky credit card 
loans, CRE loans, and LBO loans.114 
The central role of the big eighteen LCFIs in the financial crisis is con-
firmed by the enormous losses they suffered and the huge bailouts they 
received. The big eighteen LCFIs accounted for almost three-fifths of the 
$1.49 trillion of total worldwide losses recorded by banks, securities 
firms, and insurers between the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-
2007 and the beginning of 2010.115 The list of leading LCFIs is “a who’s 
who of the current financial crisis” that includes “[m]any of the firms 
that either went bust . . . or suffered huge write-downs that led to signifi-
cant government intervention.”116 Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”) failed, 
while two other members of the big eighteen LCFIs (AIG and RBS) were 
nationalized and three others (Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Wacho-
via) were acquired by other LCFIs with substantial governmental assis-
                                                                                                                       
House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at A1; Paul 
Davidson, Lawmakers Blast Former Freddie, Fannie CEOs: Execs Say Competition 
Played Role in Decisions, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2008, at 3B; Charles Duhigg, Pressured 
to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A1. 
 110. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1046. 
 111. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 112. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 982–84, 989–91, 1019–20, 1031–35, 1039–42; see 
also Jaffee, supra note 45, at 69 tbl.1.4 (showing that the big eighteen LCFIs included 
eleven of the twelve top global underwriters of CDOs during 2006 and 2007). 
 113. See Peterson, supra note 109, at 167–69; supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Jaffee et al., supra note 45, at 68–73; Saunders, Smith & Walter, supra note 
45, at 143–45; supra Part II.A.1. 
 115. Yap & Pierson, supra note 14 (showing that the big eighteen LCFIs accounted for 
$860 billion, or 58%, of the $1.49 trillion of losses suffered by banks, securities firms and 
insurers); see also Saunders, Smith & Walter, supra note 45, at 144–45 tbl.5.3 (showing 
writedowns by nine of the big eighteen LCFIs as of mid-2008). 
 116. Jaffee, supra note 45, at 69. 
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tance.117 Three additional members of the group—Citigroup, Bank of 
America (“BofA”), and UBS—survived only because they received cost-
ly government bailouts.118 JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”), Goldman Sacks 
(“Goldman”), and Morgan Stanley received substantial infusions of capi-
tal under the federal government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”), and Goldman and Morgan Stanley quickly converted to 
BHCs to secure permanent access to the FRB’s discount window as well 
as “the Fed’s public promise of protection.”119 
Only Lehman failed of the big eighteen LCFIs, but the U.S., the U.K., 
and European nations provided extensive assistance to ensure the surviv-
al of at least twelve other members of the group.120 In the U.S., the feder-
al government guaranteed the viability of the nineteen largest BHCs as 
well as AIG.121 Those institutions received $290 billion of capital infu-
sions from the federal government, and they also issued $235 billion of 
debt that was guaranteed (and thereby subsidized) by the FDIC. In con-
trast, smaller banks received only $41 billion of capital assistance and 
                                                                                                                       
 117. STOWELL, supra note 10, at 182–84, 398–405, 408–17; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 
1044–45; Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 28–30. 
 118. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 1044–45 (stating that Citigroup and BofA received 
“huge bailout packages from the U.S. government that included $90 billion of capital 
infusions and more than $400 billion of asset guarantees,” while UBS “received a $60 
billion bailout package from the Swiss government”); see also WESSEL, supra note 9, at 
239–41, 259–63 (discussing Citigroup and BofA bailouts). 
 119. WESSEL, supra note 9, at 217; see also id. at 217–18, 227, 236–40 (noting that 
Chase received $25 billion of TARP capital while Goldman and Morgan Stanley each 
received $10 billion). 
 120. Because Lehman’s collapse created a severe disruption in global financial mar-
kets, federal authorities decided to take all measures necessary to prevent other major 
LCFIs from suffering comparable failures. That decision led to the federal government’s 
bailouts of AIG, Citigroup and BofA, the infusions of TARP capital into other LCFIs and 
other extraordinary measures of support for the financial markets. See generally ANDREW 
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND 
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 
373–537 (2009); WESSEL, supra note 9, at 189–241; Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, SocGen 
Predicts ‘Challenging’ 2009, Posts Profit, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 18, 2009) (reporting 
that the French government had provided financial assistance to Société Générale by 
purchasing subordinated debt and preferred stock from the bank); supra notes 117–119 
and accompanying text (explaining that Bear, Merrill and Wachovia avoided failure due 
to government-assisted acquisitions, while AIG, RBS, BofA, Citigroup, UBS, Chase, 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley received varying amounts of direct governmental assis-
tance). 
 121. See Robert Schmidt, Geithner Slams Bonuses, Says Banks Would Have Failed 
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 4, 2009) (quoting statement by Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner that “none” of the biggest U.S. banks would have survived if the feder-
al government had not intervened to support the financial system); supra notes 9–12 and 
accompanying text. 
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issued only $11 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.122 A prominent FRB 
official recently observed that LCFIs “were central to this crisis as it ex-
panded and became a global recession. However, while the crisis caused 
workers to lose their jobs and families to forfeit their homes, the stock-
holders and creditors of these firms enjoyed special protection funded by 
the American taxpayer.”123 He further remarked, “It is no longer conjec-
ture that the largest institutions in the United States have been deter-
mined to be too big to fail. They have been bailed out.”124 
                                                                                                                       
 122. November 2009 COP Report, supra note 7, at 75, 76 fig.10 (showing that the 19 
largest BHCs received $220 billion of TARP capital and issued $235 billion of FDIC-
guaranteed debt); see also id. at 117 fig.26 (showing that AIG received $70 billion of 
TARP capital); see also id. at 6–7, 35–38, 58–63 (describing the FDIC’s Debt Guarantee 
Program (DGP) for banks and BHCs); id. at 68–72 (concluding that financial institutions 
received significant federal subsidies from issuing FDIC-guaranteed debt). Financial 
institutions other than the 19 largest BHCs issued $66 trillion of FDIC-guaranteed debt 
by October 2009. However, $55 billion of that amount was issued by GE Capital, a huge 
finance company that is a subsidiary of GE, a leading industrial conglomerate. GE Capi-
tal owns two FDIC-insured depository institutions (a thrift and an industrial bank) located 
in Utah. Federal regulators granted GE Capital special permission to issue FDIC-
guaranteed debt even though it was not a BHC and therefore did not meet the general 
terms and conditions for participation in the DGP. After subtracting the amount issued by 
GE Capital, smaller banks issued only $11 trillion of FDIC-guaranteed debt. See id. at 
37–38, 69 fig.6 (showing amount of FDIC-guaranteed debt issued by GE Capital); 75–76 
(showing amounts issued by the 19 largest BHCs and by other institutions); see also Jeff 
Gerth, Paulson’s Book Details GE Chief’s Private Concerns in 2008 Over Company’s 
Debt, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2010, at A8 (reporting on federal regulators’ approval of GE 
Capital’s participation in the DGP in November 2008, after GE Capital encountered sig-
nificant problems in selling commercial paper to fund its operations); Jeff Girth & Brady 
Dennis, How a Loophole Benefits GE in Bank Rescue: Industrial Giant Becomes Top 
Recipient in Debt-Guarantee Program, WASH. POST, June 29, 2009, at A1. 
 123. Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Regulatory 
Reform and the Economy: We Can Do Better 8, Speech at the 2009 Colorado Economic 
Forums, Denver, Colo. (Oct. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/SpeechBio/HoenigPDF/Denver.Forums.10.06.09.pdf [he-
reinafter Hoenig October 6, 2009 Speech]. 
 124. Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Leverage and 
Debt: The Impact of Today’s Choices on Tomorrow 4, Speech at the 2009 Annual Meet-
ing of the Kansas Bankers Association (Aug. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/SpeechBio/HoenigPDF/hoenigKBA.08.06.09.pdf [herei-
nafter Hoenig August 6, 2009 Speech]; see also Charles I. Plosser, President and CEO, 
Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Some Observations About Policy Lessons from the 
Crisis 3, Speech at the Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum (Dec. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2009/12-04-09_fed-policy-
forum.pdf (stating that “[d]uring this crisis and through the implementation of the stress 
tests, we have effectively declared at least 19 institutions as too big to fail”). 
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D. Recent Bailouts of LCFIs Have Confirmed Their TBTF Status, There-
by Intensifying Systemic Risk and Moral Hazard in Financial Markets 
As shown above, LCFIs became the “epicenter of the current global fi-
nancial mess” because they pursued aggressive business strategies pre-
mised on (i) maximizing short-term fee income by originating and secu-
ritizing high-risk loans, (ii) seeking speculative gains by investing in 
structured-finance securities and trading in CDS, (iii) leveraging earnings 
by manipulating regulatory capital requirements, and (iv) funding opera-
tions by relying on the continuous availability of short-term funding from 
the capital markets.125 Those high-risk business strategies exposed LCFIs 
to huge losses and potential failures when asset bubbles in U.S. and Eu-
ropean housing markets, CRE markets and LBO markets burst in the 
second half of 2007.126 Three prominent academics recently concluded 
that LCFIs 
. . . committed themselves to unusual degrees of leverage and other 
business practices on and off the balance sheet to ramp up earnings but 
which . . . jeopardized their institution’s safety and soundness, ultimate-
ly imposing a high level of risk on the financial system as a whole. This 
generalization applied equally to LCFIs originating in commercial 
banking, insurance, and investment banking. . . . All types of LCFIs 
contributed to placing the financial system and consequently the real 
economy at severe risk.127 
By 2007 LCFIs had created very high levels of systemic risk in U.S. 
and European financial markets. The term “systemic risk” is typically 
used to describe the vulnerability of financial markets and the real econ-
omy to spillover effects from (i) the failure of a major financial institu-
tion or (ii) the failures of many financial institutions with highly corre-
lated risk exposures.128 For example, the failure of a leading financial 
                                                                                                                       
 125. Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 970–71, 994–97, 1046–48.  
 126. Id. at 1032–43. 
 127. Saunders, Smith & Walter, supra note 45, at 144–45. 
 128. For helpful definitions of systemic risk, see, for example, E. PHILIP DAVIS, DEBT, 
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK 117 (1992) (defining systemic risk as “a dis-
turbance in financial markets which entails unanticipated changes in prices and quantities 
in credit or asset markets, which lead to a danger of failure of financial institutions, and 
which in turn threatens to spread so as to disrupt the payments mechanism and the ca-
pacity of the financial system to allocate capital”); Viral Acharya et al., Regulating Sys-
temic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 283, 
284–89 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) [hereinafter Acharya et al., 
Regulating Systemic Risk]; George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic 
Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, INDEP. REV., Winter 2003, at 
371, 372– 76 (2003) (describing “chain-reaction and common-shock concepts of system-
ic risk”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–204 (2008). 
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institution may create a “chain reaction” that imposes severe losses and 
the threat of failure on other important financial institutions that are 
counterparties in transactions with the failed institution. Alternatively, a 
“common economic shock” may cause the failures of many financial 
institutions with correlated exposures to that shock. In either case, wide-
spread defaults among important financial institutions are likely to cause 
significant disruptions in financial markets and to inflict serious injury on 
the real economy through a sharp increase in the cost of capital and cre-
dit and/or a steep reduction in the availability of capital and credit.129 The 
threat that AIG would default on its CDS and securities lending contracts 
with a number of major U.S. and foreign LCFIs is a good example of 
“chain reaction” systemic risk, while the highly correlated exposures of 
many LCFIs in 2007 to collapsing prices in housing, CRE, and LBO 
markets provide a striking illustration of “common economic shock” sys-
temic risk.130 As indicated by those examples, both types of systemic risk 
are likely to occur during severe and widespread financial crises. 
The systemic risk created by LCFIs during the credit boom led inexor-
ably to government-financed bailouts of major financial institutions dur-
ing the present crisis. Several years ago, I argued that emergency meas-
ures taken by governments around the world in response to systemic 
crises manifested a strong trend in favor of protecting large banks and 
their depositors: 
[G]overnment officials often proclaim their adherence to ‘market dis-
cipline’ before a banking crisis occurs, [but] the experiences of the 
Great Depression and more recent events have convinced most authori-
ties that systemic banking crises cannot be left to run their course. The 
conventional response since the 1970s has been to take the same course 
that U.S. authorities adopted after 1933—namely to recapitalize large 
banks and protect depositors against loss.131 
                                                                                                                       
 129. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 128, at 372–73, 375. 
 130. For discussions of the federal government’s decision to bail out AIG because of 
the risk that AIG’s failure would impose severe losses on major U.S. and foreign LCFIs 
that were counterparties of AIG, see, for example, SORKIN, supra note 120, at 380–407, 
532–33; TETT, supra note 87, at 233, 237–39; WESSEL, supra note 9, at 25–26, 189–98; 
Blundell-Wignall, et al., supra note 4, at 11, 12 tbl.3. For discussions of systemic risk 
resulting from the risk exposures of many LCFIs in 2007 to falling prices in housing, 
CRE, and LBO markets, see, for example, MORRIS, supra note 46, at 65–85, 113–39; 
Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 84, at 58–66; McCoy et al., supra note 9, at 
1329–33, 1338–44, 1366–71; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 970–71, 994–97, 1008–11, 
1020–24, 1032–43. 
 131. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Does Financial Liberalization Increase the Likelihood of 
a Systemic Banking Crisis? Evidence from the Past Three Decades and the Great De-
pression, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 77, 96 
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At about the same time, I predicted that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999 (“GLBA”) would make the TBTF problem much worse by “ex-
tend[ing] the scope of the TBTF subsidy to reach nonbank affiliates of 
large financial holding companies.”132 I warned that GLBA’s authoriza-
tion of financial conglomerates “increases the likelihood that major seg-
ments of the securities and life insurance industry will be brought within 
the scope of the TBTF doctrine.”133 
In fact, the current financial crisis has caused the U.S. and other na-
tions to implement massive bailouts of LCFIs, including leading securi-
ties firms and insurance companies as well as banks.134 At the height of 
the financial crisis in March 2009, FRB Chairman Bernanke declared 
that the federal government was committed to ensure the survival of 
“systemically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”) in order to pre-
vent a systemic collapse of the financial markets and an economic de-
pression.135 Chairman Bernanke defended the federal government’s deci-
sion to ensure “the continued viability” of SIFIs in the following terms: 
In the midst of this crisis, given the highly fragile state of financial 
markets and the global economy, government assistance to avoid the 
failures of major financial institutions has been necessary to avoid a 
                                                                                                                       
(Benton E. Gup ed., 2004); see also GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO 
FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 40, 75–77 (2004) (observing that many foreign 
countries provided extensive assistance to banks and protected depositors during systemic 
financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Sepa-
ration of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1589, 1598–1606 (2007) [he-
reinafter Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce] (same). 
 132. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Indus-
try, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
215, 446; see also id. at 303–04. 
 133. Id. at 447. 
 134. See Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram, Additional Insight on Use of Troubled Asset Relief Funds (SIGTARP-10-004) 2–
3, 7–9, 26–31 (Dec. 10, 2009) (discussing $4.4 billion of capital assistance provided by 
the Treasury Department to two large life insurers, Hartford Life and Lincoln National), 
available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Additional_Insight_on_Use_of_Troubled_Ass
et_Relief_Program_Funds.pdf; supra notes 9–13, 117–124 and accompanying text (de-
scribing rescues of LCFIs by the U.S. and foreign governments, including, inter alia, 
federally-assisted rescues of AIG, Bear and Merrill and federal assistance provided to 
Goldman and Morgan Stanley). 
 135. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Financial 
Reform to Address Systemic Risk, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 
2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm. 
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further serious destabilization of the financial system, and our com-
mitment to avoiding such a failure remains firm.136 
Chairman Bernanke admitted that “the too-big-to-fail issue has 
emerged as an enormous problem” because “it reduces market discipline 
and encourages excessive risk-taking” by TBTF firms.137 Several months 
later, Governor Mervyn King of the Bank of England condemned the 
perverse incentives created by TBTF subsidies in even stronger terms. 
Governor King maintained that “[t]he massive support extended to the 
banking sector around the world, while necessary to avert economic dis-
aster, has created possibly the biggest moral hazard in history.”138 He 
further argued that TBTF subsidies provided a likely explanation for de-
cisions by LCFIs to engage in high-risk strategies during the credit 
boom: 
Why were banks willing to take risks that proved so damaging to them-
selves and the rest of the economy? One of the key reasons – men-
tioned by market participants in conversations before the crisis hit – is 
that incentives to manage risk and to increase leverage were distorted 
by the implicit support or guarantee provided by government to credi-
tors of banks that were seen as ‘too important to fail.’ . . . Banks and 
their creditors knew that if they were sufficiently important to the 
economy or the rest of the financial system, and things went wrong, the 
government would always stand behind them. And they were right.139 
Industry studies and anecdotal evidence confirm that TBTF subsidies 
create significant economic distortions and promote moral hazard. In 
recent years, and particularly during the present crisis, LCFIs have oper-
ated with much lower capital ratios, and have benefited from a much 
lower cost of funds, compared with smaller banks.140 In addition, CRAs 
                                                                                                                       
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Speech to Scottish Business 
Organizations in Edinburgh 4 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf [hereinafter 
King 2009 Speech]; see also RICHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. 
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 326 (4th ed. 2009) (explain-
ing that “moral hazard” results from the fact that “[i]nsurance changes the incentives of 
the person insured . . . . [I]f you no longer fear a harm [due to insurance], you no longer 
have an incentive to take precautions against it”). 
 139. King 2009 Speech, supra note 138, at 3. 
 140. See Allen Berger et al., How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their 
Capital Ratios?, 34 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 123, 138–39, 145 (2008) (finding that, between 
1992 and 2006, banks with more than $50 billion of assets maintained significantly lower 
capital ratios, compared to smaller banks); Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 295, 301–02 
(citing additional studies finding that large banks operated with capital ratios that were 
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and bond market investors have given preferential treatment to TBTF 
institutions because of the explicit and implicit government backing they 
receive.141 The preferential status of TBTF institutions is confirmed by 
the fact that they received by far the largest share of governmental assis-
tance in the form of TARP capital assistance and FDIC debt guaran-
tees.142 The federal government publicly announced in early 2009 that it 
would ensure the survival of the nineteen largest BHCs, thereby certify-
ing their TBTF status.143 
                                                                                                                       
much lower than those of smaller banks, and that large banks also paid significantly low-
er interest rates on their deposits in comparison with smaller banks); David Cho, Banks 
‘Too Big to Fail’ Have Grown Even Bigger; Behemoths Born of the Bailout Reduce Con-
sumer Choice, Tempt Corporate Moral Hazard, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2009 (reporting 
that “[l]arge banks with more than $100 billion in assets are borrowing at interest rates 
0.34 percentage points lower than the rest of the industry,” compared to a borrowing 
advantage of 0.08% in 2007); Gretchen Morgenson, The Cost of Saving These Whales, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, § BU, at 1 (reporting on a study by Dean Baker and Travis 
McArthur, finding that (i) from 2000 through 2007, the average cost of funds for smaller 
banks was 0.29% higher than the average cost of funds for banks with $100 billion or 
more in assets, and (ii) “this spread widened to an average of 0.78 percentage point” from 
2008 through June 2009, “when bailouts for large institutions became expected”); Hoenig 
August 6, 2009 Speech, supra note 124 (observing that the ten largest U.S. banks operat-
ed with a Tier 1 common stock capital ratio of 3.2% during the first quarter of 2009, 
compared to a Tier 1 common stock capital ratio of 6.0% for banks smaller than the top-
20 banks). 
 141. See, e.g., STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 131, at 30–37 (describing preferential 
treatment given to TBTF banks by financial markets); Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 301, 
301 n.359 (citing study by Donald Morgan and Kevin Stiroh, which showed that “during 
1993-98, (i) bond markets applied substantially less market discipline to banks larger 
than $85 billion, and (ii) bond markets applied the weakest market discipline to the ele-
ven banks that the OCC publicly identified as TBTF in 1984”); Peter Eavis, Bank’s Safe-
ty Net Fraying, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2009, at C6 (reporting that “S&P gives Citigroup a 
single-A rating, but adds that it would be rated triple-B-minus, four notches lower, with 
no [governmental] assistance . . . [while] Morgan Stanley and Bank of America get a 
three-notch lift . . . [and] Goldman Sachs Group enjoys a two-notch benefit”). 
 142. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text (stating that the 19 largest BHCs 
and AIG received $290 billion of TARP capital assistance and issued $235 billion of 
FDIC-guaranteed debt, while smaller banks received only $41 billion of capital infusions 
and issued only $11 billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt). In addition, “[d]uring the second 
half of 2007, the Federal Home Loan Bank System (“FHLBS”) provided more than $200 
billion of secured credit to Citigroup, Countrywide, Merrill, Wachovia and Wamu after 
those institutions suffered severe losses from subprime mortgages and related assets. . . . 
Advances from the FHLBS helped Countrywide to survive until it received an emergency 
takeover offer from [BofA].” Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Subprime Crisis Confirms Wisdom 
of Separating Banking and Commerce, BANKING & FIN’L SERV. POL’Y REP., May 2008, at 
1, 6. 
 143. See supra notes 11–12, 121–123 and accompanying text. 
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FRB Chairman Bernanke also assured the public that federal regulators 
would not impose regulatory sanctions on the nineteen largest BHCs un-
der the “prompt-corrective-action” (“PCA”) regime established by Con-
gress in 1991.144 Federal bank regulators entered into confidential memo-
randa of understanding with BofA and Citigroup, but regulators have not 
taken any formal enforcement actions against the nineteen largest BHCs 
In contrast, regulators have initiated hundreds of formal enforcement 
proceedings against smaller banks.145 Thus, as Edward Kane has pointed 
out, the financial crisis has confirmed that major LCFIs are “too big to 
discipline adequately” (“TBTDA”) as well as TBTF.146 
Given the enormous benefits of TBTF status, LCFIs have pursued ag-
gressive growth strategies during the past two decades in order to reach a 
size at which they would be presumptively TBTF and largely immune 
                                                                                                                       
 144. Steven Sloan, Bernanke: ‘Don’t Need’ to Nationalize Weak Banks, AM. BANKER, 
Feb. 25, 2009, at 1 (reporting on congressional testimony by FRB Chairman Ben Ber-
nanke, in which Mr. Bernanke confirmed that “regulators would not employ ‘prompt-
corrective-action’ tools, . . . such as replacing management,” against the 19 largest 
BHCs); see also Richard S. Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC 
Improvements Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317 (1993) (describing PCA re-
gime mandated by Congress in 1991). 
 145. Compare Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to BofA: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., 
July 16, 2009, at C1 (reporting that (i) BofA was operating under a “secret” memoran-
dum of understanding (“MOU”) with federal regulators since May 2009, while Citigroup 
had been operating under “a similar order” since 2008; and (ii) the informal MOU proce-
dure “gives banks a chance to work out their problems without the glare of outside atten-
tion,” in contrast to a “publicly announced” formal enforcement order) with Exploring the 
Balance between Increased Credit Availability and Prudent Lending Standards Before 
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 7–8 (2009) (testimony of R. Michael S. 
Menzies, Sr., Pres. and CEO, Easton Bank and Trust Co., on behalf of the Independent 
Community Bankers of America) (stating that “I have yet to hear of an enforcement ac-
tion against a too-big-to-fail bank, while such actions are commonplace in the community 
banking industry”), available at 
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test032509.pdf. All of the formal enforcement 
orders cited in a recent survey of enforcement actions by federal bank regulators were 
issued against community banks. See Thomas P. Vartanian & Lawrence K. Nesbitt, En-
forcement Actions Against Banks Exceeded 1000 For First Time in 2009, 94 BANKING 
REP. (BNA) 444 (Mar. 2, 2010) (providing results of a survey of 1,095 formal enforce-
ment actions against banks in 2010). 
 146. Edward J. Kane, Extracting Nontransparent Safety Net Subsidies by Strategically 
Expanding and Contracting a Financial Institution’s Accounting Balance Sheet, 36 J. 
FIN. SERV. RES. 161, 162 (2009) (explaining that “in times of financial-sector distress, 
authorities can and will circumvent [PCA] constraints to assist bank and nonbank institu-
tions that they regard as either too big and too complex to fail and unwind or at least as . . 
. [TBTDA]”). 
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from takeover threats.147 Chief executive officers (“CEOs”) of LCFIs 
have strong incentives to pursue TBTF status because they “draw their 
paychecks – and their identity – from the companies they run.”148 The 
“quest for immortality” encourages CEOs to build “legacy” institutions, 
and growth also produces large increases in CEO compensation.149 
All of today’s four largest U.S. banks (BofA, Chase, Citigroup and 
Wells Fargo) are the products of serial acquisitions and explosive growth 
since 1990.150 BofA’s and Citigroup’s rapid expansions led them to brink 
                                                                                                                       
 147. See, e.g., Robert De Young et al., Mergers and Acquisitions of Financial Institu-
tions: A Review of the Post-2000 Literature, 36 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 87, 96–97, 104 (2009) 
(reviewing studies and finding that “subsidies associated with becoming ‘too big to fail’ 
are important incentives for large bank acquisitions”); Todd Davenport, Understanding 
the Endgame: Scale Will Matter, But How Much?, AM. BANKER, Aug. 30, 2006, at 1 
(describing the widespread belief among banking industry executives that “size is the best 
guarantor of survival” and that “[t]he best way—and certainly the quickest way—to 
achieve scale is to buy it”); Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 300–08 (citing additional evi-
dence for the conclusion that “TBTF status allows megabanks to operate with virtual 
‘fail-safe’ insulation from both market and regulatory discipline”); Elijah Brewer & Jula-
pa Jagtiani, How Much Would Banks Be Willing to Pay to Become ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ and 
to Capture Other Benefits? 9–20, 25–26 (Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City Econ. Research 
Dep’t Research Working Paper 07-05, 2007) (determining that large banks paid signifi-
cantly higher premiums to acquire smaller banks when (i) the acquisition produced an 
institution that crossed a presumptive TBTF threshold, such as $100 billion in assets or 
$20 billion in market capitalization, or (ii) a bank that was already TBTF acquired anoth-
er bank and thereby enhanced its TBTF status). 
 148. Davenport, supra note 147; see also Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 292–93 (stating 
that “a major growth incentive for bank managers is the widely shared assumption that 
the biggest banks will achieve permanent status at the top of the financial industry”). 
 149. Davenport, supra note 147 (noting that the CEO of the median bank with assets 
between $1 billion and $5 billion earned $636,000 in 2005, while Jamie Dimon, CEO of 
Chase, earned $22.3 million); see also Richard T. Bliss & Richard J. Rosen, CEO Com-
pensation and Bank Mergers, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 109–10, 116–19, 124–25, 135–36 
(2001) (finding that CEOs at 32 large banks increased their compensation significantly by 
entering into megamergers, and those CEOs reaped significant compensation gains even 
when they made acquisitions that negatively affected their banks’ stock values); Wil-
marth, supra note 132, at 288–89 (citing additional studies indicating that “managerial 
self-interest plays a major role in determining the frequency of mergers among both cor-
porations and banks”). 
 150. See KAUFMAN, supra note 68, at 100–05; STOWELL, supra note 10, at 405–08; 
Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 975–77; Valerie Bauerlein, Vault to the Top: Bank of America 
CEO In Spotlight After Deal—Countrywide Gives Lewis Status He Long Craved; Up 
From Walnut Grove, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at A1 (describing the tremendous 
growth of BofA under the leadership of Hugh McColl and Kenneth Lewis, and quoting 
Mr. Lewis’ belief that “size and scale do matter”); David Mildenberg, Bank of America’s 
Lewis Resigns After Bet on Rebound (Update 3), BLOOMBERG.COM, (Oct. 1, 2009) (re-
porting that Mr. Lewis spent more than $130 billion on acquisitions since becoming CEO 
in 2001, and that BofA more than tripled in size under his leadership); Annys Shin, Citi’s 
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of failure, from which they were saved by huge federal bailouts.151 Wa-
chovia (the fourth-largest U.S. bank at the beginning of the crisis) pur-
sued a similar path of frenetic growth until it collapsed in 2008 and was 
rescued by Wells Fargo in a federally-assisted merger.152 A comparable 
pattern of rapid expansion, collapse and bailout occurred among several 
European LCFIs, frequently due to CEOs who pursued similarly mis-
guided aspirations for impregnable status.153 
Unfortunately, the emergency acquisitions of LCFIs arranged by U.S. 
regulators have produced domestic financial markets in which the largest 
                                                                                                                       
Relentless Quest for Growth: History of Innovation Has Led Banks to Milestones, Mis-
steps, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008, at D1 (explaining how an “emphasis on size” and 
rapid growth “landed Citibank in the midst of every financial crisis over the past century, 
including the stock market crash of 1929, the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and 
the current financial meltdown”). 
 151. See supra notes 9, 118 and accompanying text. 
 152. For descriptions of Wachovia’s aggressive growth, see, for example, Dennis K. 
Berman et al., Wachovia Strikes $26 Billion Deal for Golden West: California S&L Will 
Give Acquisitive Giant Big Slice of Mortgage-Loan Business, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2006, 
at A1 (reporting that “Wachovia has been the most voracious [acquirer] of all, forging 
about 140 takeovers and mergers – large and small – that have transformed it from a 
sleepy Southern bank into a coast-to-coast financial-services giant”); Barbara A. Rehm, 
Wachovia Chief’s Vision: Handful of Dominant Firms, AM. BANKER, May 19, 2006, at 2 
(quoting Wachovia CEO G. Kennedy Thompson’s belief that the banking industry would 
have “a handful of dominant firms” and that “[c]onsolidation continues to make econom-
ic sense” because “size enhances competitive power”). For discussions of Wachovia’s 
collapse and the federally-assisted acquisition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo, see, for ex-
ample, Paul Davis, In Closing Act, Wachovia Lays Bare Extent of Woe, AM. BANKER, 
Oct. 23, 2008, at 1; Art Levy, Wells Fargo Chairman Prefers U.S. Plan to Buy Stakes 
(Update 3), BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 22, 2008),  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=atJpJcGxblqA; Paul Davis, 
Was It Really All Golden West?; Option ARM Hit was one of Many at Wachovia, AM. 
BANKER, Oct. 1, 2008, at 1. 
 153. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 976 (discussing rapid consolidation among 
banks in the U.K. and other European nations); Simon Clark et al., Decline of West 
Where Mathewson Rues What RBS Wrought (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, June 19, 
2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=anU5X5BaNe4M# (describ-
ing how RBS “expanded on three continents” and became the biggest European bank 
under its “hard-driving” CEO, Fred Goodwin, before RBS “collapsed” and was nationa-
lized by the U.K. government); Antonio Ligi & Ben Holland, Why Bernie Madoff Is No 
Marcel Ospel as Man Swiss Love to Hate, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aApnFtmhFswQ (discussing 
how UBS CEO Marcel Ospel “vowed to turn [UBS] into the largest global investment 
bank” and pursued a high-risk expansion strategy that resulted in “writedowns in excess 
of $50 billion” and a massive bailout of UBS by the Swiss government); supra notes 13, 
120 and accompanying text (discussing government rescues of RBS, UBS, and several 
other major European banks). 
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institutions hold even greater dominance.154 The four largest U.S. banks 
(BofA, Chase, Citigroup and Wells Fargo) now control 56% of domestic 
banking assets, up from 35% in 2000,155 while the top ten U.S. banks 
control 75% of domestic banking assets, up from 54% in 2000.156 The 
four largest banks also control a majority of the product markets for 
home mortgages, home equity loans, and credit card loans.157 Together 
with Goldman, the same four banks account for 97% of the aggregate 
notional values of OTC derivatives contracts written by U.S. banks.158 
Thus, as Nomi Prins observed last September, “[n]othing has changed [as 
a result of the financial crisis] except that we have larger players who are 
more powerful, who are more dependent on government capital and who 
are harder to regulate than they were to begin with.”159 
III. REGULATORY REFORMS TO ADDRESS SYSTEMIC RISK CREATED BY 
LCFIS 
In 2002, I warned that “the TBTF policy is the great unresolved prob-
lem of bank supervision” because it “undermines the effectiveness of 
                                                                                                                       
 154. See supra notes 10, 152 and accompanying text (discussing acquisitions of Coun-
trywide and Merrill by BofA, of Bear and Wamu by Chase, and of Wachovia by Wells 
Fargo). 
 155. Peter Eavis, Finance Fixers Still Living in Denial, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at 
C18. Compare Benton Ives, Consolidation Fuels Megabank Boom, CQ WEEKLY, Oct. 27, 
2008, at 2858 (reporting that BofA, Chase, Citigroup and Wells Fargo collectively held 
$8.5 trillion of assets, accounting for “more than half of all bank assets”) with Peter 
Boone & Simon Johnson, Shooting Banks, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2010, at 20 (stating 
that the six largest U.S. banks currently have combined assets exceeding 63% of GDP, 
while the combined assets of the six largest banks in 1995 were equal to only 17% of 
GDP). 
 156. Heather Landy, What’s Lost, Gained if Giants Get Downsized, AM. BANKER, Nov. 
5, 2009, at 1. 
 157. Kate Berry, Mortgages’ Big Two Are Too Big to Avoid, AM. BANKER, Sept. 28, 
2009, at 1 (reporting that the four largest banks “control 57.8% of the overall [mortgage] 
lending market”); David Cho, Banks ‘Too Big to Fail’ Have Grown Even Bigger, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 28, 2009 (reporting on the top four banks’ majority share of the mortgage and 
credit card markets); Renae Merle, Second Loans Complicate Homeowner Assistance, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the same four banks held 53% of the 
$840 billion of outstanding home equity loans and lines of credit); Daniel Wolfe, Top 
Issuers, with Less Appetite for Risk, Slashing Credit Lines, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2008, at 
7 (reporting that BofA, Citigroup and Chase “account for more than half of the U.S. cre-
dit card market”). 
 158. OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON 
BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FOURTH QUARTER 2009, app. graph 4 & 
tbl.5 (2009), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2010-33a.pdf. 
 159. Alison Fitzgerald & Christine Harper, Lehman Monday Morning Lesson Lost 
With Obama Regulator-in-Chief, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 11, 2009) (quoting Ms. Prins). 
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both supervisory and market discipline, and it creates moral hazard in-
centives for managers, depositors, and other uninsured creditors of 
[LCFIs].”160 The current financial crisis has confirmed that the U.S. and 
European nations adhere to a TBTF policy that embraces the entire fi-
nancial sector. Recent studies have shown that the TARP capital infu-
sions and FDIC debt guarantees announced in October 2008 represented 
very large transfers of wealth from taxpayers to the shareholders and 
creditors of the largest U.S. LCFIs.161 The enormous competitive advan-
tages enjoyed by TBTF institutions must be eliminated (or at least signif-
icantly reduced) in order to restore a more level playing field for smaller 
financial institutions and to encourage the voluntary breakup of ineffi-
cient and risky financial conglomerates. 
Despite their access to extensive government subsidies, large financial 
conglomerates have never proven their ability to achieve superior per-
formance.162 Even before the financial crisis began, economic studies 
showed that (i) large financial conglomerates were producing “higher 
levels of systemic risk on both sides of the Atlantic,”163 (ii) LCFIs were 
subject to greater risks as they increased their “involvement in nontradi-
tional activities, produced higher percentages of fee income, and relied 
more heavily on wholesale (non-deposit) funding,”164 and (iii) financial 
markets applied a significant “conglomerate discount” to banks that en-
gaged in multiple lines of financial activity, thereby indicating that 
“functional breadth impairs both competitive performance and share-
                                                                                                                       
 160. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 475. 
 161. Elijah Brewer III & Anne Marie Klingenhagen, Be Careful What You Wish for: 
The Stock Market Reactions to Bailing Out Large Financial Institutions—Evidence from 
the USA, 18 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 56, 57–59, 64–66 (2010) (finding significant 
increases in stock market valuations for the 25 largest U.S. banks as a result of Treasury 
Secretary Paulson’s announcement, on Oct. 14, 2008, of $250 billion of TARP capital 
infusions into the banking system, including $125 billion for the nine largest banks); 
Pietro Veronesi & Luigi Zingales, Paulson’s Gift 2–3, 11–31 (Chicago Booth Research 
Paper No. 09-42, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498548 (concluding that 
the TARP capital infusions and FDIC debt guarantees produced $130 billion of gains for 
holders of equity and debt securities of the nine largest U.S. banks, at an estimated cost to 
taxpayers of $21 to $44 billion). 
 162. See Kane, supra note 146, at 162 (observing that “[b]ecause safety net subsidies 
increase with size and complexity, offsetting diseconomies [of scale and scope] must 
exist in the operation of large institutions”). 
 163. See Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 996, 996 nn.139–40 (discussing pre-crisis studies 
finding that “growing convergence among the activities of banks, securities firms and 
insurance companies . . . intensified the risk that losses in one sector of the financial ser-
vices industry would spill over into other sectors and produce a systemic financial cri-
sis”). 
 164. Id. at 997 (citing study by Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Harry Huizinga). 
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holder value.”165 In addition, while each of the four largest U.S. banks 
has assets exceeding $1 trillion, studies have not found favorable econo-
mies of scale or scope in banks larger than $100 billion.166 The financial 
crisis has proven, beyond any reasonable doubt, that large universal 
banks operate based on a dangerous business model that is riddled with 
conflicts of interest and prone to speculative risk-taking.167 
Accordingly, U.S. and European governments must rapidly adopt re-
forms that will (i) greatly reduce the scope of governmental safety nets 
and thereby significantly diminish the subsidies currently provided to 
LCFIs, and (ii) facilitate the orderly failure and liquidation of LCFIs un-
der governmental supervision, with consequential losses to managers, 
shareholders and creditors of LCFIs. I believe that the following five key 
reforms are needed to accomplish these objectives: (1) strengthen current 
statutory restrictions on the growth of LCFIs, (2) create a special resolu-
tion process to manage the orderly liquidation or restructuring of SIFIs, 
(3) establish a consolidated supervisory regime and enhanced capital re-
quirements for SIFIs, (4) create a special insurance fund for SIFIs, to 
cover the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and (5) rigorously insulate 
FDIC-insured banks that are owned by LCFIs from the activities and 
risks of their nonbank affiliates. Due to space limitations, this sympo-
sium article provides only a summary overview of the proposed re-
                                                                                                                       
 165. Markus M. Schmid & Ingo Walter, Do Financial Conglomerates Create or De-
stroy Economic Value?, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 193, 214 (2009) (analyzing more than 
600 U.S. financial firms operating between 1985 and 2004); see also Luc Laeven & Ross 
Levine, Is There a Diversification Discount in Financial Conglomerates?, 85 J. FIN. 
ECON. 331, 333–335 (similarly finding, based on an analysis of more than 800 banks 
operating in 43 countries between 1998 and 2002, that “the market values of banks that 
engage in multiple activities are much lower than if those banks were broken up into 
financial intermediaries that specialized in the individual activities”). 
 166. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 279–81 (citing studies finding an absence of econo-
mies of scale or scope in LCFIs larger than $25 billion); Boone & Johnson, supra note 
155 (stating that there are “no economies of scale for banks above $100 billion in total 
assets”); see also June 2009 COP Report, supra note 7, at 51–52 fig.4 (reporting that, as 
of Mar. 31, 2009, BofA had assets of $2.3 trillion, Chase had assets of approximately 
$2.1 trillion, Citigroup had assets of approximately $1.8 trillion, and Wells Fargo had 
assets of approximately $1.3 trillion). 
 167. Saunders, Smith & Walter, supra note 45, at 143–47; Wilmarth, supra note 1, at 
970–72, 994–1002, 1024–50; Boone & Johnson, supra note 155; John Kay, Narrow 
Banking: The Reform of Financial Regulation 12–16, 41–44, 86–88 (Sept. 15, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.johnkay.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/12/JK-Narrow-Banking.pdf. 
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forms.168 I intend to develop more detailed expositions of such reforms in 
future works. 
A. Existing Statutory Limits on the Growth of LCFIs Should Be Streng-
thened 
In 1994, Congress authorized interstate bank acquisitions and interstate 
bank branching by adopting the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal Act”).169 To prevent the emergence 
of dominant megabanks, the Riegle-Neal Act imposes nationwide and 
statewide deposit concentration limits on interstate expansion by large 
banking organizations.170 A BHC may not acquire a bank in another 
state, and a bank may not merge with another bank across state lines, if 
the resulting banking organization (together with all affiliated FDIC-
insured depository institutions) would hold (i) hold ten percent or more 
of the total deposits of all depository institutions in the U.S., or (ii) thirty 
percent or more of the total deposits of all depository institutions in any 
state.171 
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of Riegle-Neal’s nationwide and 
statewide deposit concentration limits is undermined by three major loo-
pholes. First, the concentration limits do not apply to intrastate bank ac-
                                                                                                                       
 168. For the same reason of space limitations, this article will not analyze a regulatory 
reform bill that was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2009. See 
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Key_Issues/Financial_Regulatory_Reform/FinancialRe
gulatoryReform/hr4173eh.pdf. For helpful summaries of H.R. 4173, see Gail C. 
Bernstein, Matthew A. Chambers, Sara A. Kelsey & Martin E. Lybecker, Are We Half-
way There Yet? House Passes Major Financial Services Bill with Senate Expected to Act 
Early This Year, 127 BANKING L. J. 12 (2010); Mike Ferullo, Malini Manickavasagam, 
Richard Hill & R. Christian Bruce, Regulatory Reform: House Clears Regulatory Reform 
Package Calling for New Controls on Financial Sector, 93 BANKING REP. (BNA) 1167 
(Dec. 15, 2009). As this article went to press, it was not clear whether the Senate would 
pass similar legislation. See Alison Vekshin, Dodd Says Panel Has ‘No Agreement’ on 
Financial Rules Overhaul, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 5, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& sid=aSPIHb52zYGw. 
 169. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-328, Sept. 29, 1994. 
 170. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-448, at 65–66 (1994) (additional views of Rep. Neal and 
Rep. McCollum) (explaining that the Riegle-Neal Act “adds two new concentration limits 
to address concerns about potential concentration of financial power at the state and na-
tional levels”), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039, 2065–66. 
 171. Riegle-Neal Act, §§ 101, 102, 108 Stat. 2340, 2345 (codified as amended in 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1831u(b)(2), 1842(d)(2)). The Riegle-Neal Act permits a state to waive or 
relax, by statute, regulation or order, the thirty percent statewide concentration limit with 
respect to interstate mergers or acquisitions involving banks located in that state. See 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1831u(b)(2)(D), 1842 (d)(2)(D). 
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quisitions or intrastate bank mergers. Second, the concentration limits do 
not apply to acquisitions of, or mergers with, thrift institutions and indus-
trial banks, because those institutions are not treated as “banks” for pur-
poses of the Riegle-Neal Act.172 Third, the concentration limits do not 
apply to acquisitions of, or mergers with, banks that are “in default or in 
danger of default.”173 
The acquisitions of Countrywide, Merrill, Washington Mutual (“Wa-
Mu”), and Wachovia demonstrate the significance of Riegle-Neal’s loo-
pholes and the need to close them. In reliance on the “non-bank” loo-
phole, the FRB allowed BofA to acquire Countrywide and Merrill even 
though (i) both firms controlled FDIC-insured depository institutions (a 
thrift, in the case of Countrywide, and a thrift and industrial bank, in the 
case of Merrill), and (ii) both transactions allowed BofA to exceed the 
ten percent nationwide deposit cap.174 Similarly, after the FDIC seized 
control of WaMu as a failed depository institution, the FDIC sold the 
giant thrift to Chase even though the transaction enabled Chase to exceed 
the ten percent nationwide deposit cap.175 Finally, although the FRB de-
termined that Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia would give Wells 
Fargo control of just under ten percent of nationwide deposits, the FRB 
could probably have approved the acquisition in any case by designating 
Wachovia as a bank “in danger of default.”176 
                                                                                                                       
 172. See Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and an Industrial 
Loan Company (Bank of America Corporation), FED. RES. BULL., B13, B14 (Mar. 2009) 
[hereinafter FRB BofA-Merrill Order] (noting that thrifts and industrial banks “are not 
‘banks’ for purposes of the [Riegle-Neal] Act and its nationwide deposit cap”). 
 173. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831u(e), 1842(d)(5). 
 174. See Order Approving the Acquisition of a Savings Association and Other Non-
banking Activities (Bank of America Corporation), FED. RES. BULL., C81–C82, C83 n.13 
(Aug. 2008) (approving BofA’s acquisition of Countrywide and Countrywide’s thrift 
subsidiary, even though the transaction resulted in BofA’s ownership of 10.9% of na-
tionwide deposits); FRB BofA-Merrill Order, supra note 172, at B13–B14, B14 n.6 (ap-
proving BofA’s acquisition of Merrill and Merrill’s thrift and industrial bank subsidiaries, 
even though the transaction resulted in BofA’s ownership of 11.9% of nationwide depo-
sits). 
 175. Joe Adler, Thrift M&A Could Suffer As Frank Slams ‘Loophole’, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 10, 2009, at 1. 
 176. See Statement by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Regard-
ing the Application and Notices by Wells Fargo & Company to Acquire Wachovia Cor-
poration and Wachovia’s Subsidiary Banks and Nonbanking Companies (Wells Fargo & 
Company), FED. RES. BULL., B40, B41–42 (Mar. 2009) (determining that “the combined 
organization would not control an amount of deposits that would exceed the nationwide 
deposit cap on consummation of the proposal”); id. at B48 (concluding that “expeditious 
approval of the proposal was warranted in light of the weakened condition of Wacho-
via”). 
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The foregoing acquisitions have enabled BofA, Chase, and Wells Far-
go to surpass the ten percent nationwide deposit cap.177 Thus, the loo-
pholes in Riegle-Neal’s concentration limits have allowed giant TBTF 
and TBTDA institutions to reach a size that Congress clearly did not an-
ticipate. To prevent further breaches of the Riegle-Neal limits, Congress 
should extend the nationwide and statewide deposit caps to cover all in-
trastate and interstate transactions involving acquisitions of, or mergers 
with, any type of FDIC-insured depository institution (including thrifts 
and industrial banks). 
In addition, Congress should significantly narrow the failing bank ex-
ception by requiring federal regulators to make a “systemic risk determi-
nation” (“SRD”) in order to invoke that exception. Thus, an SRD would 
be a precondition to any acquisition or merger involving a failing FDIC-
insured depository institution that would exceed one of the Riegle-Neal 
concentration limits. 
Congress should establish the following requirements for an SRD. 
First, the FRB and FDIC should be required to determine jointly, with 
the concurrence of the Treasury Secretary, that the proposed transaction 
is necessary to avoid a substantial threat of severe systemic injury to the 
banking system, the financial markets, or the national economy. Second, 
each SRD should be published and reported in writing to the Systemic 
Risk Oversight Council described below (“SROC”) and to Congress. 
Third, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) should undertake 
an audit to determine whether regulators satisfied the criteria for an SRD, 
and the SRD and the GAO audit report should be reviewed in a joint 
hearing held by the House and Senate committees with oversight of the 
financial markets.178 Mandating the SRD Procedure would ensure much 
greater public transparency of, and scrutiny for, any federal agency order 
that invokes the “failing bank” exception to the Riegle-Neal concentra-
tion limits. The SRD Procedure would also ensure similar public transpa-
rency and scrutiny for regulatory decisions of comparable importance, as 
discussed below. 
The Obama Administration has recently announced its support for a 
proposal by former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker to prohibit mergers and 
acquisitions that would give a single bank control of more than ten per-
cent of total bank liabilities other than insured deposits (the “Volcker 
liabilities cap”). The Volcker liabilities cap would supplement the exist-
                                                                                                                       
 177. See Matt Ackerman, Big 3 Deposit Share Approaches 33%, AM. BANKER, Oct. 
28, 2008, at 16 (reporting the nationwide deposit shares for BofA, Chase, and Wells Far-
go as 11.3%, 10.2%, and 11.2%, respectively). 
 178. The foregoing process for approving and reviewing an SRD is hereinafter referred 
to as the “SRD Procedure.” 
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ing Riegle-Neal deposit concentration limits and would be subject to the 
same exemption for acquisitions of banks “in default or in danger of de-
fault.”179 If enacted, the Volcker liabilities cap would present a signifi-
cant barrier to further acquisitions of banks by BofA, Chase, and Citi-
group.180 As a practical matter, the Volcker liabilities cap would have the 
greatest impact on Citigroup, because Citigroup currently is not close to 
exceeding the Riegle-Neal nationwide deposit cap. In contrast, the 
Riegle-Neal nationwide deposit concentration limit already blocks the 
three major rivals of Citigroup (BofA, Chase, and Wells Fargo) from 
making further interstate acquisitions of banks.181 
The Volcker liabilities cap has been criticized as vague and unworka-
ble.182 It remains to be seen whether the proposal can be clarified in a 
manner that would give it a utility and ease of application comparable to 
the Riegle-Neal deposit concentration limits. If it is appropriately clari-
fied, the Volcker liabilities cap should be adopted as a supplemental me-
thod of restricting the growth of very large banks (e.g., Citigroup, Gold-
man, and Morgan Stanley) that rely mainly on the capital markets, rather 
than deposits, for their funding.183 For the reasons stated above with re-
gard to the Riegle-Neal limits, the Vocker liabilities cap should apply to 
acquisitions of all FDIC-insured depository institutions (including thrifts 
and industrial banks), and regulators should not be able to invoke the 
“failing bank” exception unless they comply with the SRD Procedure. 
                                                                                                                       
 179. Rebecca Christie & Phil Mattingly, ‘Volcker Rule’ Draft Signals Obama Wants to 
Ease Market Impact, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 4, 2010. 
 180. Id. (reporting that U.S. banks held $10.4 trillion of liabilities, while Chase, BofA, 
and Citigroup held liabilities of $1.5 trillion, $1.3 trillion, and $1 trillion, respectively). 
 181. See Kevin Dobbs, Even After Infusion, Citi Seen Needing Fix, AM. BANKER, Nov. 
25, 2008, at 1 (reporting that Citigroup had only $200 billion of domestic deposits, com-
pared to the more than $600 billion of domestic deposits held by each of its three major 
rivals); supra note 177 and accompanying text (citing news article reporting that BofA, 
Chase, and Wells slightly exceeded the Riegle-Neal 10% nationwide deposit cap). 
 182. Cheyenne Hopkins, Obama to Banks: Big Is Bad, AM. BANKER, Jan. 25, 2010, at 
22 (quoting criticisms of the proposed Volcker liabilities cap by Jamie Cox of Harris 
Financial Group and Sean Ryan of Wisco Research). 
 183. See Heather Landy, Review/Preview: Goldman and Morgan Stanley Ditch Bank-
ing Script, So Far, AM. BANKER, Dec. 30, 2009, at 1 (reporting that Goldman and Mor-
gan Stanley relied primarily on the capital markets for funding, as each firm had less than 
$70 billion of deposits in 2009); supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text (stating 
that Citigroup had $1 trillion of assets but only $200 billion of domestic deposits). 
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B. A Special Resolution Regime Should Be Authorized for Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions 
Regulators and analysts support the creation of a special resolution re-
gime to handle the failures of SIFIs.184 As shown by the FRB-assisted 
rescue of Bear Stearns, the federal government’s massive bailout of AIG, 
and the traumatic collapse of Lehman, federal regulators currently con-
front a “Hobson’s choice of bailout or disorderly bankruptcy” when they 
decide how to respond to a SIFI’s potential failure.185 A statutory resolu-
tion regime for SIFIs, similar to the existing resolution regime for FDIC-
insured depository institutions,186 would be a highly beneficial “third 
way, between bankruptcy and bailout, that would either euthanize [SIFIs] 
peacefully or resuscitate them under new management.”187 This special 
resolution regime for SIFIs should include three essential elements. 
First, Congress should establish an SROC, consisting of federal offi-
cials representing the Treasury Department, the FRB, the FDIC, the 
OCC, the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), 
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as well as state officials 
representing the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and 
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors.188 The FRB and the FDIC 
                                                                                                                       
 184. See, e.g., Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp., Statement on 
the Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (Jan. 14, 2010), available at 
http://fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairnman/spjan1410.html [hereinafter Bair FCIC 
Testimony]; Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 
Financial Regulatory Reform, Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 26, 2010) 
[hereinafter Tarullo Regulatory Reform Speech], available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20100226a.htm; Alan S. Blind-
er, Time for Financial Reform, Plan C, THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE  (Feb. 2010), at 2, avail-
able at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol7/iss1/art5/; Stephen Joyce, Regulatory Reform: 
Cohen Says Not Enacting Financial Reform ‘Unthinkable’ But Opposes ‘Volcker Rule’, 
94 BANKING REP. (BNA) 464 (Mar. 9, 2010) (citing view of H. Rodgin Cohen that “creat-
ing [a] resolution authority that would allow even the largest U.S. financial institutions to 
fail should be the ‘lynchpin’ of any meaningful financial regulatory overhaul”). 
 185. Regulatory Reform Speech, supra note 184. 
 186. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, ch. 13 (describing the FDIC’s 
resolution regime for failed banks). 
 187. Blinder, supra note 184, at 2; see also Bair FCIC Testimony, supra note 184 
(stating, while discussing potential financial reforms, that “[f]oremost among needed 
reforms is a new legal and regulatory framework for large interconnected firms [i.e., SI-
FIs] to ensure their orderly wind-down while avoiding financial disruptions that could 
devastate our financial markets and economy,” and suggesting that the “FDIC’s authority 
to resolve failing banks and thrifts is a good model”). 
 188. The proposed SROC would include all seven of the primary federal regulators of 
financial institutions and financial markets, as well as the organizations that represent 
state regulators of insurance companies and state-chartered banks. I would not include the 
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should have joint responsibility for designating financial firms as SIFIs 
on a quarterly basis, based on criteria established by the SROC and after 
consultation with the SROC. The SROC should have authority (by the 
affirmative vote of at least five of its seven members who are not repre-
sentatives of the FRB or FDIC) either (i) to designate a financial firm as 
a SIFI, in the event of a disagreement between the FRB and the FDIC, or 
(ii) to overrule the FRB’s and FDIC’s joint decision to designate a finan-
cial firm as a SIFI. The criteria for identifying a financial firm as a SIFI 
should be based on factors relevant to systemic risk, including the firm’s 
size and the risk of contagion from the firm’s failure due to (i) the firm’s 
interconnectedness or correlations of risk exposures with other important 
financial institutions or financial markets or (ii) the firm’s role as a key 
participant within one or more important sectors of the financial mar-
kets.189 
Some commentators have opposed any identification of SIFIs, due to 
concerns that firms designated as SIFIs would be treated as TBTF by the 
financial markets and would create additional moral hazard.190 However, 
moral hazard already exists in abundance because the financial markets 
are currently treating major LCFIs as TBTF. As noted above, during the 
current crisis federal regulators publicly identified and supported the ni-
neteen largest BHCs, as well as Bear and AIG, as TBTF institutions.191 
As a result of this massive and explicit governmental support, CRAs, 
                                                                                                                       
OTS on the SROC. As I have explained elsewhere, I believe that (i) the federal thrift 
charter should be abolished, and existing federal thrifts should be required to convert into 
national or state banks, and (ii) the OTS should be abolished and its existing supervisory 
functions and staff should be transferred to the OCC. The current financial crisis has 
demonstrated (as the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s previously showed) that it is not 
desirable to charter federally-insured depository institutions that engage primarily in 
housing finance. Such institutions expose the federal deposit insurance fund and taxpay-
ers to an excessive risk of loss due to the boom-and-bust cycles that have characterized 
housing markets over the past century. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Comment Letter to 
the U.S. Treasury Department Concerning the Regulatory Structure for Financial Institu-
tions 1–2 (Geo. Wash. U. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 388, 2007), avail-
able at http://ssrn/com/abstract=1067065. 
 189. See, e.g., Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 128, at 283–92; 
Saunders, Smith & Walter, supra note 45, at 151–55; James B. Thomson, On Systemical-
ly Important Financial Institutions and Progressive Systemic Mitigation 1–6 (Fed. Re-
serve Bank of Clev. Pol’y Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009). 
 190. See Malini Manickavasagam & Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: Witnesses 
Warn Against Identifying Institutions as Systemically Significant, 41 SEC. REG. L. REP. 
(BNA) 502 (2009). 
 191. See supra notes 9–12, 117–124, 130–137, 143–144 and accompanying text. 
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depositors, and bondholders are giving highly preferential treatment to 
LCFIs that are viewed as TBTF.192 
Accordingly, it is no longer credible for federal regulators to pretend 
that they can retreat to their former policy of “constructive ambiguity” by 
asserting their willingness to allow major LCFIs to collapse into disor-
derly bankruptcies similar to the Lehman debacle.193 Any such assertion 
would not be believed by the public or the financial markets.194 As 
shown below, the best way to impose effective discipline on SIFIs, and 
to reduce the federal subsidies they receive, would be to designate them 
publicly as SIFIs and to impose stringent regulatory requirements that 
would force them to internalize the potential costs of their TBTF status. 
Second, the FRB and FDIC should have shared authority to initiate the 
new special resolution regime for a failing SIFI, based on a joint finding 
that the SIFI either (i) has fallen below a specified minimum capital thre-
shold or (ii) is facing a near-term risk of insolvency or bankruptcy due to 
a lack of adequate liquidity or a threatened acceleration of outstanding 
creditor claims. The resolution process for a failed SIFI should be admi-
nistered by the FDIC, given its experience in resolving large bank fail-
ures.195 
                                                                                                                       
 192. See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text. 
 193. Thomson, supra note 189, at 8–9. 
 194. For example, Herbert Allison recently claimed before the Congressional Over-
sight Panel (“COP”) that “[t]here is no ‘too big to fail’ guarantee on the part of the U.S. 
government.” Members of the COP responded to Mr. Allison’s claim with derision and 
disbelief. COP member Damon Silvers declared, “I do not understand why it is that the 
United States government cannot admit what everyone in the world knows.” Cheyenne 
Hopkins, Pandit Sees a New Citigroup, But Others aren’t Convinced, AM. BANKER, Mar. 
5, 2010, at 1 (noting that Mr. Allison’s claim “angered and baffled the panelists”). 
 195. Due to current limitations on its statutory authority, the FDIC does not have expe-
rience in resolving the failures of large holding companies that control banks. However, 
the FDIC’s failure resolution process for banks appears to provide a better model for 
designing a new process to ensure an orderly resolution of SIFIs, compared to Chapter 11 
bankruptcy procedures. See, e.g., Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Remarks to the Council of Institutional Investors (Apr. 12, 2010), available 
at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spapr1210.html; Edward R. Morri-
son, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Sys-
temically Important Institutions? 10–16 (Columbia L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 362, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1529802 (concluding that creation of a new 
regulatory process for regulating SIFIs and resolving their failures would be preferable to 
an approach that would rely on Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings to resolve such fail-
ures). For a more favorable view of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy alternative, see Kenneth 
Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts? (U. Pa. L. Sch. Instit. L. & Econ. 
Res. Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1362639. A detailed 
analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
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The resolution process for SIFIs should include the following prin-
ciples: (A) stockholders must lose their entire investment if the SIFI is 
unable to pay all valid creditor claims, (B) senior managers must be dis-
missed, together with other employees who were responsible for the 
SIFI’s failure, and (C) unsecured creditors must be required to accept 
meaningful “haircuts,” either in the form of a significant reduction in the 
amount of their debt claims or an exchange of a substantial amount of 
their debt for stock of a successor institution. In other words, the resolu-
tion process for a SIFI should resemble, to the maximum extent possible, 
the outcome of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding.196 The FDIC should 
be required to prepare an SRD, and to comply with the SRD Procedure, 
if it decides either that (A) it must depart from any of the foregoing prin-
ciples, or (B) it must advance funds to support the SIFI’s resolution 
without a reasonable assurance of repayment from the proceeds of the 
resolution. Any net proceeds realized by the FDIC from a SIFI’s resolu-
tion (over and above the FDIC’s expenses in carrying out the resolution) 
should be added to the Systemic Risk Insurance Fund (“SRIF”), de-
scribed below.197 
Third, Congress should limit the FRB’s ability to make loans to SIFIs 
under its emergency lending authority contained in § 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act.198 The FRB should be prohibited from extending credit to 
SIFIs under § 13(3) for more than ninety days unless (i) the SIFI has 
been placed in a resolution process or (ii) the FRB makes an SRD and 
complies with the SRD Procedure. In addition, the FRB should not be 
allowed to make additional § 13(3) loans to a SIFI after initiation of the 
resolution process. 
C. SIFIs Should Be Subject to Consolidated Supervision by the FRB and 
Should Comply with Systemic Risk Capital Requirements 
Congress should designate the FRB as the consolidated supervisor for 
SIFIs, subject to the oversight of the SROC. Given the FRB’s experience 
as the regulator of BHCs and as the “umbrella supervisor” for financial 
holding companies (“FHCs”), it is the logical choice as the consolidated 
supervisor for SIFIs.199 However, the FRB has a longstanding concern 
                                                                                                                       
 196. See Bair FCIC Testimony, supra note 184. 
 197. See infra Part III.D. 
 198. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006); see also Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Cir-
cumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at Part II.E) (describing the FRB’s emergency lending 
authority under § 13(3)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1584731. 
 199. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 437–40, 455–60, 465–74 
(discussing the FRB’s supervision of BHCs and FHCs); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regu-
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with maintaining the stability of financial markets, and it has frequently 
intervened in the markets to avoid the failure of significant firms that 
might threaten financial stability.200 The FRB thus has a tendency to 
grant forbearance to LCFIs in order to maintain financial stability, and 
the SROC should therefore be given oversight powers to prevent the 
FRB from granting excessive leniency to SIFIs. 
As consolidated supervisor, the FRB should have power to examine, 
and require reports from, SIFIs and their subsidiaries and affiliates. The 
FRB should also have authority to take enforcement actions (including 
cease-and-desist orders, civil money penalty orders, and orders removing 
directors and officers) against SIFIs and their subsidiaries and affiliates. 
The FRB’s authority in these matters should be direct. The FRB should 
not be required (as it is under current law) to rely primarily on actions 
taken by regulators of functionally regulated subsidiaries (e.g., banks, 
securities broker-dealers, and insurance companies).201 
If a functional regulator (e.g., the OCC or the SEC) believes that ac-
tions by the FRB as systemic risk regulator are creating an unwarranted 
conflict with the functional regulator’s supervision of a functionally re-
gulated subsidiary, the functional regulator should have the right to ap-
peal to the SROC. By a two-thirds vote, the SROC could require the 
FRB to rescind or modify any regulatory action with regard to a func-
tionally regulated subsidiary of a SIFI that the SROC determined was not 
necessary or appropriate to prevent a serious threat to the stability of the 
SIFI or any of the SIFI’s FDIC-insured subsidiaries. 
The FRB should also have authority, with the concurrence of the 
FDIC, to establish systemic risk capital requirements (“SRCRs”) for SI-
FIs. The FDIC should be given a concurrent role in establishing SRCRs 
in view of its role as administrator of the SRIF.202 The FDIC’s responsi-
bilities for administering the SRIF would encourage the FDIC to apply 
                                                                                                                       
lating Risk Not Function, 66 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 441, 478–86 (1998) (contending that the 
FRB is best situated to act as “systemic risk regulator” for financial conglomerates). 
 200. The FRB’s extraordinary efforts to prevent widespread failures among LCFIs 
during the current financial crisis are broadly consistent with the FRB’s past responses to 
financial crises. From 1970 to 2001, the FRB repeatedly intervened in the financial mar-
kets to prevent the failure of large financial institutions and to preserve financial stability. 
See Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 470–73. 
 201. Under current law, the FRB is required to rely “to the fullest extent possible” on 
reports provided and examinations conducted by primary regulators of functionally regu-
lated subsidiaries of BHCs and FHCs. The FRB has only limited authority to require 
reports from, to conduct examinations of, or to take enforcement actions against, func-
tionally regulated subsidiaries of BHCs and FHCs. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1844(c), 1844(e), 
1844(g), 1848a; CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 457–60. 
 202. See infra Part III.D. 
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strict discipline against SIFIs in order to protect the SRIF’s solvency. 
Accordingly, the FDIC’s tendency toward supervisory stringency would 
serve as a desirable counterweight against the FRB’s tendency toward 
supervisory forbearance.203 If the FRB and the FDIC disagreed over the 
appropriate level of SRCRs, the SROC could resolve the disagreement 
and specify SRCRs by a vote of at least five members other than the rep-
resentatives of the FRB and FDIC. 
SRCRs should include a leverage capital requirement, which would be 
calculated based on the total (unweighted) assets of each SIFI. A leve-
rage requirement is a useful tool for limiting excessive risk-taking by 
financial institutions, and it is an essential supplement to risk-based capi-
tal requirements. In 2007, European banks and U.S. investment banks 
operated with very high asset-to-equity ratios (usually above 30:1) be-
cause they were subject only to risk-based capital rules and did not have 
to satisfy a leverage capital requirement. By contrast, asset-to-equity ra-
tios for U.S. commercial banks were typically below 25:1 because those 
banks had to comply with a leverage requirement as well as risk-based 
capital rules. To provide an additional margin for safety, the minimum 
leverage capital requirement for SIFIs should be increased to a level well 
above the current requirement of five percent for well-capitalized institu-
tions.204 
                                                                                                                       
 203. For example, the conduct of the FRB and the FDIC during the negotiations that 
led to the Basel II international capital accord indicated that the FRB was more inclined 
than the FDIC to accommodate the interests and concerns of large banks. During those 
negotiations, the FRB actively supported an “advanced internal risk-based” (“A-IRB”) 
method for establishing capital requirements for the largest banks. The A-IRB method 
was favored by major banks because it allowed each bank to calculate its capital needs 
based on internal quantitative risk models, as long as those models satisfied supervisory 
criteria. Major banks supported the A-IRB method because that approach held out the 
possibility of significantly reducing their capital requirements. In contrast to the FRB, the 
FDIC expressed great skepticism about the A-IRB approach. The FDIC therefore insisted 
that federal regulations implementing Basel II must include transitional, phased-in capital 
floors to prevent any rapid drop in risk-based capital requirements under the A-IRB me-
thod. In addition, the FDIC fought hard to preserve the U.S. leverage capital requirement 
as an essential safeguard that would help maintain adequate capital levels at all U.S. 
banks, even though the Basel II accord did not include any leverage requirement. See 
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 99–130 (2008). 
 204. For sources supporting the imposition of a leverage capital requirement, and not-
ing the disparity between the asset-to-equity ratios at U.S. commercial banks and the 
significantly higher (and more risky) ratios at U.S. investment banks and European banks 
in 2007, see Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 84, at 93–96; Blundell-Wignall et 
al., supra note 4, at 18–22; Haldane, supra note 84, at 7 (stating that “[o]ne simple means 
of altering the rules of the asymmetric [risk] game between banks and the state is to place 
heavier restrictions on leverage”). 
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In addition to a leverage requirement, SRCRs should incorporate risk-
based components, including rules that emphasize “the importance of 
common equity” as well as the need to “reduce pro-cyclical tendencies 
by establishing special capital buffers that would be built up in boom 
times and drawn down as conditions deteriorate.”205 The marginal rates 
for risk-based SRCRs should become progressively higher as a SIFI pos-
es greater systemic risk due to (a) increases in its size, complexity, or 
interconnectedness with other LCFIs, (b) hazards created by an aggres-
sive compensation structure for managers or for key employees who 
work in high-risk areas (e.g., proprietary trading), and/or (c) weaknesses 
in the SIFI’s liquidity.206 In addition, SRCRs should take full account of 
all risk exposures of a SIFI, whether those exposures are held on the 
SIFI’s balance sheet or are linked to OBS entities.207 
One intriguing proposal would require each SIFI to issue “contingent 
capital” as one component of its SRCR. This contingent capital would be 
issued in the form of convertible subordinated debt. That debt would 
convert automatically into common stock upon the occurrence of a des-
ignated event of financial stress, such as (i) a decline in the SIFI’s capital 
below a specified level that would “trigger” an automatic conversion, or 
(ii) the initiation by the FRB and the FDIC of the special resolution 
process for a SIFI. One advantage of contingent capital is that the SIFI’s 
common equity would be increased (due to the mandatory conversion of 
subordinated debt) at a time when the SIFI would face significant finan-
cial stress and probably could not sell stock in the market. Additionally, 
mandatory conversion would encourage holders of convertible subordi-
nated debt to exercise greater discipline over the SIFI’s management, 
since those holders would risk losing their entire investment if mandatory 
conversion occurred.208 
The biggest problem with the contingent capital proposal is that out-
side investors would be reluctant to purchase convertible subordinated 
debt unless the terms of the debt included a relatively high interest rate or 
other investor-friendly features (e.g., a voluntary conversion option on 
                                                                                                                       
 205. Tarullo Regulatory Reform Speech, supra note 184. 
 206. For one approach to calculating SRCRs, see Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic 
Risk, supra note 128, at 289–93. 
 207. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (describing how LCFIs retained 
large risk exposures to OBS conduits during the credit boom that led to the current finan-
cial crisis). 
 208. For discussion of proposals for a contingent capital requirement, see, for example, 
Christopher L. Culp, Contingent Capital vs. Contingent Reverse Convertibles for Banks 
and Insurance Companies, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2009, at 17, 23–27; Emily Flitter, 
Push for ‘Contingent Capital’ Has Momentum, AM. BANKER, Oct. 2, 2009, at 1; David 
Henry, The Second Coming of ‘Safer’ Securities, BUSINESS WK., Dec. 7, 2009, at 56. 
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favorable terms) that would offset the risk of forfeiture due to a mandato-
ry conversion event. SIFIs and outside investors therefore might not be 
able to agree on an interest rate and other terms for contingent capital 
that would be acceptable to both sides.209 
Contingent capital might be a much more feasible option if it is used to 
compensate senior managers and other key employees. Managers and 
key employees would become “captive investors” for contingent capital 
if they were required to accept convertible subordinated debentures in 
payment of a significant portion (e.g., one-third) of their annual compen-
sation. Managers and key employees should not be allowed to make vo-
luntary conversions of their subordinated debentures into common stock 
until the expiration of a minimum holding period (e.g., three years) after 
the termination date of their employment. Such a minimum post-
employment holding period would discourage managers and key em-
ployees from taking excessive risks to boost the value of the conversion 
option during the term of their employment. At the same time, their de-
bentures would be subject to mandatory conversion into common stock 
upon the occurrence of a designated event of financial stress. Requiring 
managers and key employees to hold a significant portion of contingent 
capital could give them positive incentives to manage their SIFI prudent-
ly in accordance with the interests of creditors as well as shareholders. 
Such a requirement would also force managers and key employees to 
share a significant portion of the loss if their SIFI is threatened with fail-
ure.210 
D. SIFIs Should Be Required to Pay Risk-Based Premiums to Establish a 
Systemic Risk Insurance Fund Administered by the FDIC 
To accomplish a further reduction in TBTF subsidies, Congress should 
require SIFIs to pay risk-based insurance premiums to establish the 
SRIF. SRIF insurance premiums should be established by the FDIC with 
the FRB’s concurrence. If the FDIC and FRB disagree about the appro-
priate schedule for SRIF premiums, the SROC should possess authority 
to resolve the disagreement and to specify SRIF premiums by a vote of at 
least five members other than the FDIC’s and FRB’s representatives. 
                                                                                                                       
 209. See Culp, supra note 208, at 27; Flitter, supra note 208; Henry, supra note 208. 
 210. For two other recent proposals that call for managers and key employees to re-
ceive part of their compensation in debt securities in order to encourage them to avoid 
excessive risk-taking, see Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 
98 GEO. L. J. 247, 283–86 (2010); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Struc-
turing Executive Compensation and Risk Regulation 31–51 (Emory L. & Econ. Res. Pa-
per No. 10-60, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546229. 
762 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:3 
The FDIC should be required to assess SRIF premiums in order to es-
tablish, within a period not to exceed five years, a SRIF that would pro-
vide reasonable protection to taxpayers against the cost of a future sys-
temic financial crisis. As explained above, federal regulators provided 
$290 billion of capital assistance to the nineteen largest BHCs (each with 
assets of more than $100 billion) and to AIG during the current crisis.211 
It therefore appears that (i) $300 billion (appropriately adjusted for infla-
tion) would be the minimum acceptable size for the SRIF, and (ii) SRIF 
premiums should be paid by all BHCs with assets of more than $100 bil-
lion (also adjusted for inflation) and by all other designated SIFIs. As 
with SRCRs, the marginal rates for SRIF premiums should become pro-
gressively higher as SIFIs pose greater systemic risk, adopt riskier com-
pensation structures, and/or maintain inadequate liquidity.212 In addition, 
the FDIC should impose additional assessments on SIFIs in order to rep-
lenish the SRIF within three years after the SRIF incurs any loss due to 
the failure of a SIFI. 
For four reasons, it is essential to establish a pre-funded SRIF. First, it 
is unlikely that most SIFIs would have adequate financial resources to 
pay large SRIF premiums after one or more of their peers failed during a 
financial crisis. LCFIs are frequently exposed to highly correlated risk 
exposures during a serious financial disruption, because they followed 
similar high-risk business strategies (“herding”) during the credit boom 
that led to the crisis.213 Many LCFIs are therefore likely to suffer severe 
                                                                                                                       
 211. See supra notes 9–12, 121–123 and accompanying text. 
 212. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 128, at 293–94; see also Xin 
Huang et al., A Framework for Assessing the Systemic Risk of Major Financial Institu-
tions, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 2036 (2009) (proposing a stress testing methodology for 
calculating an insurance premium sufficient to protect against losses of more than 15% of 
the total liabilities of twelve major U.S. banks during the period 2001–2008, and conclud-
ing that the hypothetical aggregate insurance premium would have had an “upper bound” 
of $250 billion in July 2008). 
 213. A recent study concluded that market returns of the 100 largest banks, securities 
firms, insurers, and hedge funds became “highly interconnected,” and their risk exposures 
became “highly interrelated,” during the current financial crisis as well as during (i) the 
dotcom-telecom bust of 2000–2002 and (ii) the crisis surrounding Russia’s debt default 
and the threatened failure of Long-Term Capital Management, a major hedge fund, in 
1998. Monica Billio et al., Measuring Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sec-
tors 16–17, 40–47 (MIT Sloan Sch. Mgmt. Working Paper 4774-10, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571277. For additional evidence indicating that banks and other 
financial institutions engage in herding behavior that can trigger systemic financial crises, 
see Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Information Contagion and Bank Herding, 40 
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 215, 215–17, 227–29 (2008); Viral V. Acharya & Tanju 
Yorulmazer, Too Many To Fail – An Analysis of Time-Inconsistency in Bank Closure 
Policies, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 2–4, 18–19, 24–27 (2007); Raghuram G. Rajan, 
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losses and to face a substantial risk of failure during a major disturbance 
in the financial markets.214 Consequently, a post-funded SRIF (i) would 
probably not be able in the short term to collect enough premiums from 
surviving SIFIs to cover the costs of resolving one or more failed SIFIs, 
and (ii) would therefore have to borrow large sums from the federal gov-
ernment to cover short-term resolution costs. Even if the SRIF ultimately 
repaid the borrowed funds by imposing ex post assessments on surviving 
SIFIs, the public and the financial markets would understandably con-
clude that the federal government provided bridge loans to bail out credi-
tors of the failed SIFIs.215 Accordingly, a post-funded SRIF would not be 
successful in eliminating many of the implicit subsidies (and associated 
moral hazard) that our current TBTF policy has created. 
Second, in a post-funded system, the most reckless SIFIs (which would 
be the most likely to fail) would effectively shift the potential costs of 
their risk-taking to the most prudent SIFIs, because the latter would be 
more likely to survive and bear the ex post costs of resolving failed SI-
FIs. Thus, a post-funded SRIF is undesirable because “firms that fail 
never pay and the costs are borne by surviving firms.”216 
Third, a pre-funded SRIF would create beneficial incentives that would 
encourage each SIFI to monitor other SIFIs and to alert regulators to ex-
cessive risk-taking by those institutions. Every SIFI would know that the 
failure of another SIFI would deplete the SRIF and would also trigger 
future assessments that it and other surviving SIFIs would have to pay. 
Thus, each SIFI would have good reason to complain to regulators if it 
became aware of unsound practices or conditions at another SIFI. 
Fourth, a pre-funded SRIF would reduce the TBTF subsidy for SIFIs 
by forcing them to internalize more of the “negative externality” (i.e., the 
potential public bailout cost) of their activities.217 A pre-funded SRIF 
would provide a reserve fund, paid for by SIFIs, that would protect gov-
ernments and taxpayers from having to incur the expense of underwriting 
future bailouts of failed SIFIs. 
                                                                                                                       
Has Finance Made the World Riskier?, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 499, 499–503, 513–22 
(2006). As described above in Part III, major LCFIs engaged in parallel behavior that 
resembled herding during the credit boom that precipitated the present crisis, particularly 
with regard to high-risk securitized lending in the residential and commercial mortgage 
markets and the corporate LBO market. 
 214. See supra notes 115–122 and accompanying text (showing that the big eighteen 
LCFIs accounted for nearly three-fifths of the $1.5 trillion of losses incurred by global 
banks, securities firms and insurers during the current crisis, and twelve of those institu-
tions were bailed out or received substantial governmental assistance). 
 215. Bair FCIC Testimony, supra note 184. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 128, at 293–95. 
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To further reduce the potential TBTF subsidy for SIFIs, the SRIF 
should be strictly separated from the existing Deposit Insurance Fund 
(“DIF”). To ensure this separation, Congress should repeal the “system-
ic-risk exception” that is currently included in the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act (“FDI Act”).218 The FDIC relied on that exception when it 
joined with the Treasury Department and the FRB in providing more 
than $400 billion of asset guarantees to Citigroup and BofA.219 The DIF 
should no longer be available as a potential source of protection for cred-
itors of SIFIs. Instead, the SRIF should be designated as the exclusive 
source of future funding for resolutions of failed SIFIs. Thus, the system-
ic-risk exception for the DIF should be repealed, and the FDIC should be 
required to apply the least-cost test in resolving all future bank fail-
ures.220 Repeal of the systemic-risk exception would ensure that the DIF 
is no longer viewed as a potential bailout fund for TBTF banking organi-
zations. 
E. Banks Controlled by Financial Holding Companies Should Operate as 
“Narrow Banks” to Ensure that They Cannot Transfer Their Federal 
Safety Net Subsidies to Their Nonbank Affiliates 
In January 2010, President Obama announced his support for the 
“Volcker rule” proposed by former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker. The 
Volcker rule would prohibit FDIC-insured banks and companies control-
ling such banks from owning or controlling hedge funds or private equity 
funds or from engaging in proprietary trading (i.e., buying and selling 
securities, derivatives, and other tradable assets for their own account). 
Trading in the capital markets by banks and their holding companies 
would be limited to “market making” activities conducted on behalf of 
                                                                                                                       
 218. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2006) (allowing the FDIC, with the concurrence of 
the Treasury Secretary and the FRB, to disregard the least-cost requirement for bank 
resolutions if the failure of a bank “would have serious adverse effects on economic con-
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731–32 (discussing “systemic-risk exception”). 
 219. See Press Release, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve and the FDIC on 
Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/pres/2008/pr08125.html; Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. 
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 220. The least-cost test requires the FDIC to “meet the obligation of the [FDIC] to 
provide insurance coverage for the insured deposits” in a failed bank by using the ap-
proach that is “least costly to the [DIF].” 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(i), (ii) (2006). 
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clients.221 The primary purpose of the Volcker rule is to prevent govern-
ment safety nets from “protecting and supporting essentially proprietary 
and speculative activities.”222 As this article went to press, it was uncer-
tain whether Congress would adopt the Volcker rule. One of the most 
widely-shared critiques of the rule was the difficulty in distinguishing 
between permissible market-making for clients and prohibited proprie-
tary trading for a bank’s own account.223 
In my view, the most feasible way to accomplish the basic purpose of 
the Volcker rule—namely, to prevent SIFIs from using the federal safety 
net to subsidize their speculative activities in the capital markets—would 
be to create a two-tiered structure of bank regulation and deposit insur-
ance. As described below, the first tier of “traditional” banking organiza-
tions would provide a relatively broad range of banking-related services, 
but those organizations would not be allowed to engage in, or affiliate 
with firms engaged in, securities underwriting or dealing, insurance un-
derwriting or derivatives dealing. In contrast, the second tier of “narrow 
banks” could affiliate with “nontraditional” firms engaged in capital 
markets activities, except for private equity investments. However, “nar-
row banks” would be prohibited from making any extensions of credit or 
other transfers of funds to their nonbank affiliates, except for lawful div-
idends paid to their parent holding companies. The “narrow bank” ap-
proach provides the most practicable method for ensuring that banks 
cannot transfer their safety net subsidies to affiliated companies engaged 
in speculative activities in the capital markets, and it is therefore consis-
tent with the spirit of the Volcker rule.224 
                                                                                                                       
 221. See Cheryl Bolen et al., Regulatory Reform: White House Seeks Tough Limits on 
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MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 65, 121–32 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 
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1. The First Tier of Traditional Banking Organizations 
Under my proposal, the first tier of regulated banking firms would be 
“traditional” banking organizations that limit their activities (including 
the activities of all holding company affiliates) to lines of business that 
meet the ‘“closely related to banking” test under Section 4(c)(8) of the 
Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”).225 For example, this first tier 
of traditional banks could take deposits, make loans, and offer fiduciary 
services, as well as act as agents in selling securities, mutual funds, and 
insurance products underwritten by non-affiliated firms. Additionally, 
they could underwrite and deal solely in “bank-eligible” securities that 
national banks are permitted to underwrite and deal in directly.226 First-
tier banking organizations could also purchase, as end-users, derivatives 
solely for bona fide hedging transactions that qualify for hedging treat-
ment under FASB’s Financial Accounting Standard (“FAS”) Statement 
No. 133.227 
Most first-tier banking firms would probably be smaller, community-
based banks, because those banks do not have any comparative advan-
tage—and therefore have not shown any substantial interest—in engag-
ing as principal in insurance underwriting, securities underwriting, or 
                                                                                                                       
2002) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Financial Conglomerates]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too 
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bank subsidiaries of BHCs under § 4(c)(8)). 
 226. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 132–34 (discussing “bank-
eligible” securities that national banks are authorized to underwrite or purchase or sell for 
their own account); Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 225, 225–26 n.30 (same). 
 227. See Wilmarth, Financial Conglomerates, supra note 224, at 117 n.132 (discussing 
FASB’s adoption of FAS 133); see also Financial Accounting Standards Board, State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments 
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dealing, derivatives dealing, or other capital markets activities. Those 
community banks are well positioned to continue their traditional busi-
ness of attracting core deposits, providing relationship loans to consum-
ers and small and medium-sized business firms, and offering wealth 
management services to local customers through their fiduciary opera-
tions.228 
In order to provide reasonable flexibility for this first tier of traditional 
banks, Congress should amend Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act by allow-
ing the FRB to expand the list of “closely related” activities that are per-
missible for holding company affiliates of traditional banks.229 However, 
Congress should prohibit first-tier BHCs from engaging as principal in 
underwriting or dealing in securities, underwriting any type of insurance 
(except for credit insurance), dealing in OTC derivatives, or making pri-
vate equity investments. Traditional banks and their holding companies 
would continue to operate under their current supervisory arrangements, 
and all of the banks’ deposits (up to the current statutory limit of 
$250,000) would be covered by deposit insurance. 
2. The Second Tier of Nontraditional Banking Organizations 
In contrast to first-tier banking firms, the second tier of “nontradition-
al” banking organizations would be allowed to engage in (i) underwriting 
and dealing (i.e., proprietary trading) in “bank-ineligible” securities, (ii) 
underwriting insurance, and (iii) dealing or trading in derivatives. 
Second-tier organizations would include: (A) FHCs registered under Sec-
tions 4(k) and 4(l) of the BHC Act,230 (B) holding companies owning 
grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (C) grandfathered “unitary thrift” 
holding companies.231 In addition, firms controlling industrial banks 
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should be required either to register as FHCs or to divest their ownership 
of such banks if they cannot comply with the BHC Act’s prohibitions 
against commercial activities.232 Second-tier holding companies would 
thus encompass all of the largest banking organizations, most of which 
are heavily engaged in capital markets activities, together with other fi-
nancial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions. 
a. The “Narrow Bank” Structure for Second-Tier Banks 
Under this proposal, FDIC-insured depository institutions that are sub-
sidiaries of second-tier holding companies would be required to operate 
as “narrow banks.” Narrow banks could offer all permissible types of 
FDIC-insured deposit accounts, including checking and savings ac-
counts. These banks would hold all of their assets in the form of cash and 
marketable, short-term debt obligations, including qualifying government 
securities, highly-rated commercial paper, and other liquid, short-term 
debt instruments that are eligible for investment by MMMFs under the 
SEC’s rules. Narrow banks could not hold any other types of loans or 
investments, nor could they accept any uninsured deposits. Narrow banks 
would present a very small risk to the DIF, because (i) each narrow 
bank’s non-cash assets would consist solely of short-term securities that 
could be “marked to market” on a daily basis, and the FDIC could there-
fore readily determine whether a narrow bank was threatened with insol-
vency, and (ii) the FDIC could promptly convert a narrow bank’s assets 
into cash if the FDIC decided to liquidate the bank and pay off the claims 
of its insured depositors.233 
Thus, narrow banks would effectively operate as FDIC-insured 
MMMFs. In order to prevent unfair competition with narrow banks, and 
to avoid future government bailouts of uninsured MMMFs, firms that 
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manage uninsured MMMFs should be prohibited from representing, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, that they will redeem their shares based on a 
“constant net asset value” (“NAV”) of $1 per share.234 Currently, the 
MMMF industry (which manages $3.3 trillion of assets) leads investors 
to believe that their funds will be available for withdrawal (redemption) 
based on “a stable price of $1 per share.”235 Not surprisingly, “the $1 
share price gives investors the false impression that money-market funds 
are like [FDIC-insured] bank accounts and can’t lose money.”236 Howev-
er, “[t]hat myth was shattered in 2008” when Lehman’s default on its 
commercial paper caused Reserve Primary Fund (a large MMMF that 
invested heavily in Lehman’s paper) to suffer large losses and to “break 
the buck.”237 Reserve Primary Fund’s inability to redeem its shares based 
on a NAV of $1 per share caused an investor panic that precipitated runs 
on several MMMFs. The Treasury Department responded by establishing 
the Money Market Fund Guarantee Program (“MMFGP”) which pro-
tected investors in participating MMMFs between October 2008 and 
September 2009.238 
Critics of MMMFs maintain that the Treasury’s MMFGP has created 
an expectation of similar government bailouts if MMMFs “break the 
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BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aZq9IO8WsG0Q; see also 
November 2009 COP Report, supra note 7, at 28 (stating that MMMFs are “structured to 
be highly liquid and [to] protect principal by maintaining a stable net asset value (NAV) 
of $1.00 per share”). 
 236. Reilly, supra note 235; see also Kay, supra note 167, at 65 (arguing that an 
MMMF with a constant NAV of $1 per share “either confuses consumers or creates an 
expectation of government guarantee”). 
 237. Reilly, supra note 235; see also Christopher Condon, Volcker Says Money-Market 
Funds Weaken U.S. Financial System, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=a5O9Upz5e0Qc. 
 238. November 2009 COP Report, supra note 7, at 28–35 (describing creation and 
terms of the Treasury Department’s MMFGP); Reilly, supra note 235 (describing “panic” 
that occurred among investors in MMMFs after Lehman’s collapse forced the Reserve 
Primary Fund to “break the buck”); Malini Manickavasagam, Mutual Funds: Citing Sta-
bility, Treasury Allows Expiration of Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, 93 
BANKING REP. (BNA) 508 (2009) (reporting that “[t]o prevent other money market funds 
from meeting the Reserve fund’s fate, Treasury launched its [MMFGP] in October 2008” 
and continued that program until Sept. 18, 2009). 
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buck” in the future.239 In addition, former FRB chairman Paul Volcker 
has argued that MMMFs weaken banks because of their ability to offer 
bank-like products without equivalent regulation. MMMFs typically of-
fer accounts with check-writing features, and they provide returns to in-
vestors that are higher than bank checking accounts because MMMFs do 
not have to pay FDIC insurance premiums or to comply with other bank 
regulations.240 A Group of Thirty report, which Mr. Volcker spear-
headed, proposed that MMMFs “that want to offer bank-like services, 
such as checking accounts and withdrawals at $1 a share, should reorgan-
ize as a type of bank, with appropriate supervision and government in-
surance.”241 In contrast, MMMFs that do not wish to operate as banks 
“should not maintain the implicit promise that investors’ money is al-
ways safe” and should be required to base their redemption price on a 
floating NAV.242 
                                                                                                                       
 239. Jane Bryant Quinn, Money Funds Are Ripe for ‘Radical Surgery’, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, July 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601212&sid=a6iLSlGSSoFo; see also 
Reilly, supra note 235 (arguing that the failure of federal authorities to reform the regula-
tion of MMMFs “creates the possibility of future market runs and the need for more gov-
ernment bailouts”). 
 240. Condon, supra note 237; Quinn, supra note 239 (observing that “[b]anks have to 
hold reserves against demand deposits and pay for [FDIC] insurance” while “[m]oney 
funds offer similar transaction accounts without being burdened by these costs. That’s 
why they usually offer higher interest rates than banks”). 
 241. Quinn, supra note 239 (summarizing recommendation presented in a January 
2009 report by the Group of Thirty); see GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 29 (2009), available at 
http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf (recommending that “[m]oney market 
mutual funds wishing to continue to offer bank-like services, such as transaction account 
services, withdrawals on demand at par, and assurances of maintaining a stable net asset 
value (NAV) at par, should be required to reorganize as special-purpose banks, with ap-
propriate prudential regulation and supervision, government insurance, and access to 
central bank lender-of-last resort facilities”). “The Group of Thirty . . . is a private, non-
profit, international body composed of very senior representatives of the private and pub-
lic sectors and academia. It aims to deepen understanding of international economic and 
financial issues, to explore the international repercussions of decisions taken in the public 
and private sectors, and to examine the choices available to market practitioners and poli-
cymakers.” About the Group of 30, http://www.group30.org/about.htm (last visited May 
21, 2010). 
 242. Quinn, supra note 239 (summarizing recommendations of Group of Thirty); see 
GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 247, at 29 (stating that MMMFs “should be clearly diffe-
rentiated from federally insured instruments offered by banks” and should base their pric-
ing on “a fluctuating NAV”); see also Reilly, supra note 235 (supporting the Group of 
Thirty’s recommendation that MMMFs “either use floating values—and so prepare in-
vestors for the idea that these instruments can lose money—or be regulated as if they are 
bank products”); Kay, supra note 167, at 65 (similarly arguing that “[i]t is important to 
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For the above reasons, uninsured MMMFs should be prohibited from 
representing, explicitly or implicitly, that they will redeem shares based 
on a stable NAV. If Congress imposed this prohibition on MMMFs and 
adopted my proposal for a two-tiered structure of bank regulation, many 
MMMFs would probably reorganize as FDIC-insured narrow banks and 
would become subsidiaries of second-tier FHCs.243 As noted above, rules 
restricting the assets of narrow banks to commercial paper, government 
securities, and other types of marketable, highly-liquid investments 
would protect the DIF from any significant loss if a narrow bank failed. 
b. Four Additional Rules Would Prevent Narrow Banks from Transfer-
ring Safety Net Subsidies to Their Affiliates 
Four supplemental rules are needed to prevent second-tier holding 
companies from exploiting their narrow banks’ safety net subsidies. 
First, narrow banks should be prohibited from making any extensions of 
credit or other transfers of funds to their affiliates, except for the pay-
ment of lawful dividends out of profits to their parent holding compa-
nies.244 During times of financial crisis, the FRB has repeatedly waived 
the current restrictions on affiliate transactions mandated by Sections 
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.245 Those waivers have allowed 
bank subsidiaries of FHCs to provide extensive support to affiliated se-
curities broker-dealers and MMMFs. By granting those waivers, the FRB 
has enabled banks controlled by FHCs to transfer the safety net subsidy 
provided by low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits to their nonbank affili-
ates.246 With respect to second-tier banking organizations, my proposal 
                                                                                                                       
create very clear blue water between deposits, subject to government guarantee, and [un-
insured MMMFs], which may be subject to market fluctuation”). 
 243. See Quinn, supra note 239 (describing strong opposition by Paul Schott Stevens, 
chairman of the Investment Company Institute (the trade association representing the 
mutual fund industry), against any rule requiring uninsured MMMFs to quote floating 
NAVs, because “[i]nvestors seeking guaranteed safety and soundness would migrate 
back to banks” and “[t]he remaining funds would become less attractive because of their 
fluctuating price”). 
 244. Scott, supra note 233, at 929; Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 224, at 
79–82, 86. 
 245. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2006); see also infra note 246 (describing the FRB’s 
waivers of sections 23A and 23B). 
 246. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 456–57, 472–73 (discussing the FRB’s waiver of § 
23A restrictions so that major banks could make large loans to their securities affiliates 
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001); Wilmarth, supra note 142, at 9 (de-
scribing the FRB’s waiver of § 23A restrictions in August 2007, so that major banks 
could provide credit to support their securities affiliates following the outbreak of the 
subprime lending crisis); see also Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affili-
ates: Exemption for Certain Purchases of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper by a Member 
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would replace Sections 23A and 23B with an absolute prohibition on any 
extensions of credit or other transfers of funds by second-tier banks to 
their nonbank affiliates. That reform would effectively prevent the FRB 
from approving any similar transfers of safety net subsidies by narrow 
banks to their affiliates. 
Second, as discussed above, the “systemic risk” provision currently in-
cluded in the FDI Act should be repealed. By repealing the “systemic 
risk” exception, Congress would require the FDIC to follow the least 
costly resolution procedure for every failed bank, and the FDIC could no 
longer rely on the TBTF policy as a justification for protecting uninsured 
creditors of a failed bank’s parent holding company or other nonbank 
affiliates of a failed bank.247 
Insulating the DIF from any possibility of TBTF bailouts would have 
important benefits. It would make clear to the financial markets that the 
DIF could only be used to protect depositors of failed banks. Uninsured 
creditors of FHCs—regardless of their size—would no longer have any 
reasonable expectation of being protected by the DIF. Shareholders and 
creditors of FHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries would therefore have 
stronger incentives to monitor the financial condition of such entities. 
Additionally, smaller banks would no longer bear any part of the cost 
of rescuing uninsured creditors of TBTF banks. Under current law, all 
FDIC-insured banks must pay a special assessment (allocated in propor-
tion to their total assets) to reimburse the FDIC for the cost of protecting 
uninsured claimants of a TBTF bank under the “systemic risk” provi-
sion.248 A 2000 FDIC report noted the unfairness of expecting smaller 
banks to help pay for “systemic risk” bailouts when “it is virtually incon-
ceivable that they would receive similar treatment if distressed.”249 The 
FDIC report suggested that the way to correct this inequity is “to remove 
the systemic risk exception from the [FDI Act],”250 as I have proposed 
here. 
Third, second-tier narrow banks should be prohibited from dealing in 
derivatives or from purchasing derivatives except as end-users for bona 
                                                                                                                       
Bank From an Affiliate, 74 Fed. Reg. 6226 (Feb. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
223) (approving waivers of §§ 23A and 23B in order to “increase the capacity” of banks 
to purchase ABCP from affiliated MMMFs, and explaining that such waivers—which 
had originally been granted in September 2008—were justified “[i]n light of ongoing 
dislocations in the financial markets, and the impact of such dislocations on the function-
ing of the ABCP markets and on the operations of [MMMFs]”). 
 247. See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. 
 248. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii) (2006). 
 249. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Options Paper, Aug. 2000, at 33, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/initiative/Options_080700m.pdf. 
 250. Id. 
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fide hedging purposes pursuant to FAS 133.251 All other derivatives ac-
tivities of second-tier banking organizations must be conducted through 
separate nonbank affiliates. This rule would prevent FHCs from continu-
ing to exploit federal safety net subsidies by conducting risky derivatives 
activities within their FDIC-insured bank subsidiaries. 
I have previously pointed out that bank dealers in OTC derivatives en-
joy significant competitive advantages over nonbank dealers because of 
the banks’ explicit and implicit safety net subsidies.252 Banks typically 
borrow funds at significantly lower interest rates than their holding com-
pany affiliates because (i) banks can obtain direct, low-cost funding 
through FDIC-insured deposits, and (ii) banks present lower risks to their 
creditors because of their direct access to other federal safety net re-
sources, including (A) the FRB’s discount window lending facility, (B) 
the FRB’s guarantee of interbank payments made on Fedwire, and (C) 
the greater potential availability of TBTF bailouts for uninsured creditors 
of banks (as compared to creditors of BHCs).253 The OCC has confirmed 
that FHCs generate higher profits when they conduct derivatives activi-
ties directly within their banks, in part because the “favorable [funding] 
rate enjoyed by the banks” is lower than “the borrowing rate of their 
holding companies.”254 Such an outcome may be favorable to FHCs, but 
it is certainly not beneficial to the DIF and taxpayers, because they are 
exposed to a higher risk of losses when derivatives activities are con-
ducted directly within banks instead of within nonbank holding company 
affiliates.255 
                                                                                                                       
 251. See Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 224, at 84–85 (explaining why nar-
row banks should be allowed to purchase derivatives solely for hedging purposes); supra 
note 227 and accompanying text (discussing FAS 133). 
 252. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 336–37, 372–73. 
 253. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 492; Wilmarth, supra note 
142, at 5–7, 16 n.39. 
 254. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC INTERPRETIVE LETTER NO. 
892, at 3 (from Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., to Rep. James A. Leach, 
Chairman of H. Committee on Banking & Financial Services), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/sep00/int892.pdf. 
 255. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 372–73. For general discussions of the risks posed 
by OTC derivatives to banks and other financial institutions, see, for example, id. at 337–
78; RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 7–142 (2007); TETT, supra note 87, passim. 
CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has proposed legislation that would require “standard” (as 
opposed to “customized”) derivatives to be traded on exchanges or clearinghouses in-
stead of being arranged through privately-negotiated contracts with OTC dealers. Chair-
man Gensler contends that “standard” derivatives should be traded on exchanges or clea-
ringhouses in order to (i) increase the public transparency of trading positions and prices, 
and (ii) force derivatives counterparties to post collateral, as required by the relevant 
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Fourth, second-tier banks and their affiliates should be prohibited from 
making private equity investments. To accomplish this reform, Congress 
must repeal Sections 4(k)(4)(H) and (I) of the BHC Act,256 which allow 
FHCs to make merchant banking investments and insurance company 
portfolio investments.257 Private equity investments by second-tier bank-
ing organizations should be banned because they involve a high degree 
of risk and have inflicted significant losses on FHCs in the past.258 In 
addition, private equity investments “could potentially weaken the sepa-
ration of banking and commerce” by allowing FHCs “to maintain long-
term control over entities that conduct commercial (i.e., nonfinancial) 
businesses.”259 Such affiliations between banks and commercial firms are 
undesirable because they are likely to create serious competitive and 
economic distortions, including the spread of federal safety net benefits 
to the commercial sector of our economy.260 
In combination, the four supplemental rules described above would 
help to ensure that narrow banks cannot transfer their federal safety net 
subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. Restricting the scope of safety net 
subsidies is of utmost importance in order to restore a more level playing 
                                                                                                                       
exchange or clearinghouse, to protect against the risk of counterparty default. See, e.g., 
Graham Bowley, A Convert to Reform: Goldman Deal-Maker Now Advocates Regula-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at B1; Ian Katz & Robert Schmidt, Gensler Turns Back 
on Wall Street to Push Derivatives Overhaul, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 12, 2010, available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=a3OkrdITAZtA. I strong-
ly support Chairman Gensler’s proposal, but a detailed discussion of that proposal is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
 256. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H), (I) (2006). 
 257. See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 138, at 483–85 (explaining that 
“through the merchant banking and insurance company investment provisions, [GLBA] 
allows significant nonfinancial affiliations” with banks). 
 258. See Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 330–32, 375–78. 
 259. Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 131, at 1581–82 
(noting, however, that the FRB and the Treasury Dept. have so far “impose[d] strict limi-
tations” on such investments in order to help preserve the separation of banking and 
commerce). 
 260. For further discussion on this argument, see id. at 1588–1613. Federal regulators 
recently provided a large federal safety net subsidy to GE, a major industrial conglome-
rate, when they allowed GE’s finance company subsidiary, GE Capital, to issue $55 bil-
lion of FDIC-guaranteed debt during 2008 and 2009. Federal regulators permitted GE 
Capital, which owns a thrift and industrial bank, to issue debt through the FDIC’s DGP 
after GE Capital experienced difficulties in selling commercial paper to fund its opera-
tions. GE Capital received this subsidy even though it is not a BHC and did not satisfy 
the general terms and conditions of the FDIC’s DGP. See supra note 122. This incident 
illustrates the potential risk that affiliations between banks and commercial firms will 
result in an extension of the federal safety net from the banking sector to the commercial 
sector of the economy. 
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field between small and large banks, and between banking and nonbank-
ing firms. Safety net subsidies have increasingly distorted our regulatory 
and economic policies over the past three decades. During that period, 
nonbanking firms have pursued every available avenue to acquire FDIC-
insured depository institutions so that they can secure the funding advan-
tages provided by low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits. At the same time, 
nonbank affiliates of banks have made every effort to exploit the funding 
advantages and other safety net benefits conferred by their affiliation 
with FDIC-insured institutions.261 The enormous benefits conferred by 
federal safety net subsidies are conclusively shown by the following 
facts: (i) no major bank organization has ever voluntarily surrendered its 
banking charter, and (ii) large nonbanking firms have aggressively pur-
sued strategies to secure control of FDIC-insured depository institu-
tions.262 
The most practicable way to prevent the spread of federal safety net 
subsidies, and their distorting effects on regulation and economic activi-
ty, is to establish strong barriers that prohibit narrow banks from transfer-
ring their subsidies to their nonbanking affiliates, including those en-
gaged in speculative capital markets activities.263 The narrow bank struc-
ture and the supplemental rules described above would force financial 
conglomerates to prove that they can produce superior risk-related re-
turns to investors without relying on governmental subsidies. As noted 
above, economic studies have not confirmed the existence of favorable 
economies of scale or scope in financial conglomerates, and those con-
glomerates have not been able to generate consistently positive returns, 
even under the current regulatory system that allows them to capture ex-
tensive federal subsidies.264 
A prominent bank analyst recently suggested that if Congress enacted 
new rules that imposed severe restrictions on affiliate transactions, and 
thereby prevented nonbank subsidiaries of FHCs from relying on low-
cost deposit funding provided by their affiliated banks, large FHCs 
would not be economically viable and would be forced to break up vo-
                                                                                                                       
 261. Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 131, at 1569–70, 
1584–93; Wilmarth, supra note 142, at 5–8; see also Kay, supra note 167, at 43 (“The 
opportunity to gain access to the retail deposit base has been and remains irresistible to 
ambitious deal makers. That deposit base carries an explicit or implicit government guar-
antee and can be used to leverage a range of other, more exciting, financial activities. The 
archetype of these deal-makers was Sandy Weill, the architect of Citigroup.”). 
 262. Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 131, at 1590–93. 
 263. See Kay, supra note 167, at 57–59. 
 264. See supra notes 165–167 and accompanying text. 
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luntarily.265 It is noteworthy that many of the largest commercial and in-
dustrial conglomerates in the U.S. and Europe have been broken up 
through hostile takeovers and voluntary divestitures during the past three 
decades because they proved to be “less efficient and less profitable than 
companies pursuing more focused business strategies.”266 It is long past 
time for financial conglomerates to be stripped of their safety net subsi-
dies so that they will be subject to the same type of scrutiny and discip-
line that the capital markets have applied to commercial and industrial 
conglomerates during the past thirty years. The narrow bank concept 
provides a workable plan to impose such scrutiny and discipline on 
FHCs. 
c. Responses to Critiques of the Narrow Bank Proposal 
Critics have raised three major objections to the narrow bank concept. 
First, critics point out that the asset restrictions imposed on narrow banks 
would prevent them from acting as intermediaries of funds between de-
positors and most borrowers. As noted above, most narrow bank propos-
als would require such banks to invest their deposits in safe, highly mar-
ketable assets such as those permitted for MMMFs. Narrow banks would 
therefore be largely or entirely barred from making commercial loans. As 
a result, a banking system composed exclusively of narrow banks could 
not provide credit to small and midsized business firms that lack access 
to the capital markets and depend on banks as their primary source of 
outside credit.267 
                                                                                                                       
 265. Karen Shaw Petrou, the managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, recently 
explained that “[i]nteraffiliate restrictions would limit the use of bank deposits on non-
banking activities,” and “[y]ou don’t own a bank because you like branches, you own a 
bank because you want cheap core funding.” Ms. Petrou therefore concluded that pro-
posed federal legislation, which would impose tough restrictions on affiliate transactions, 
“really strikes at the heart of a diversified banking organization” and “I think you would 
see most of the very large banking organizations pull themselves apart” if Congress 
passed such legislation. Stacy Kaper, Big Banks Face Most Pain Under House Bill, AM. 
BANKER, Dec. 2, 2009, at 1 (quoting Ms. Petrou). 
 266. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 284; see also Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Bustup 
Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms, 51 J. FIN. 1175, 1175–78, 1198 (1996); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–8, 52–60 (1986); Chris Veld & Yulia V. Veld-Merkoulova, Value 
Creation Through Spin-Offs: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 11 INT’L J. MGMT. 
REVS. 407 (2009). 
 267. See, e.g., Neil Wallace, Narrow Banking Meets the Diamond-Dybvig Model, 20 
FRB of Minn. Q. Rev. (Winter 1996), at 3; Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 224, 
at 79–81 (explaining that narrow banks would be prohibited from making commercial 
loans, except perhaps for a limited basket of loans based on a fraction of their equity 
capital). 
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However, my two-tiered proposal would greatly reduce any disruption 
of the traditional role of banks in acting as intermediaries between depo-
sitors and bank-dependent firms by permitting first-tier “traditional” 
banks (primarily community banks) to continue making commercial 
loans that are funded by deposits. Community banks make most of their 
commercial loans in the form of longer-term “relationship” loans to 
small and midsized firms. Community banks have significant advantages 
in making such loans, because (i) their main offices are located in the 
communities where they make most of their commercial loans and their 
employees are therefore well informed about the character, reputation, 
and skills of local business owners, (ii) they maintain greater continuity 
in their branch managers and loan officers, thereby creating stronger re-
lationships with local business owners, and (iii) they typically provide 
greater flexibility to their loan officers and business customers.268 Under 
my proposal, community banks could carry on their deposit-taking and 
lending activities as first-tier banking organizations without any change 
from current law, and their primary commercial lending customers would 
continue to be smaller, bank-dependent firms. 
In contrast to community banks, most big banks do not make a sub-
stantial number of relationship loans to small firms. Instead, big banks 
primarily make loans to large and well-established firms. In addition, 
when big banks do provide credit to smaller firms they primarily do so 
through automated “transaction-based” programs that (A) disburse loans 
in relatively small amounts (usually under $100,000), (B) use centra-
lized, impersonal approval methods based on credit scoring, and (C) ena-
ble loans to be securitized into asset-backed securities sold to investors in 
the capital markets.269 Under my proposal, as indicated above, most large 
banks would operate as subsidiaries of second-tier “nontraditional” bank-
ing organizations. Second-tier holding companies would conduct their 
business lending programs through nonbank finance subsidiaries that are 
funded by commercial paper and other debt instruments that are sold to 
investors in the capital markets. This operational structure should not 
create a substantial disincentive for the small business lending programs 
currently offered by big banks, because major segments of those pro-
grams (e.g., business credit card loans) are already financed by the capi-
tal markets through securitization. Accordingly, my two-tier proposal 
should not cause a significant reduction in bank loans to bank-dependent 
                                                                                                                       
 268. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 261–66; see also Allen N. Berger et al., Does Func-
tion Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and 
Small Banks, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 239–46, 254–62, 266 (2005). 
 269. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 264–66; see also Berger et al., supra note 268, at 
240–41, 266. 
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firms, as big banks have already moved away from traditional relation-
ship-based lending funded by deposits.270 
The second major criticism of the narrow bank proposal is that it 
would lack credibility because federal regulators would retain the inhe-
rent authority (whether explicit or implicit) to organize bailouts of major 
financial firms during periods of severe economic distress. Accordingly, 
some critics maintain that the narrow bank concept would simply shift 
the TBTF problem from the insured bank to its nonbank affiliate.271 
However, the force of this objection would be greatly diminished if Con-
gress established a new comprehensive regime for regulating SIFIs as 
described above, including a special resolution process, SRCRs, consoli-
dated supervision, and mandatory payment of SRIF insurance pre-
miums.272 This proposed systemic risk supervision regime would ensure 
that all nonbanking firms that might be considered for TBTF bailouts are 
designated and regulated as SIFIs. In addition, all SIFIs would be re-
quired to pay premiums to fund the SRIF, and a fund separate from the 
DIF would therefore exist to resolve the failure of major nonbanking 
firms. 
Accordingly, the narrow bank structure would prevent FDIC-insured 
banks that are controlled by SIFIs from transferring their safety net sub-
sidies to their nonbank affiliates, and the systemic risk supervisory re-
gime would force nonbank SIFIs to internalize the potential risks to fi-
nancial and economic stability that result from their operations. In com-
bination, both regulatory reforms should greatly reduce any TBTF subsi-
dies that might otherwise be available to large nonbank firms. 
The third principal objection to the narrow bank proposal is that it 
would place U.S. FHCs at a significant disadvantage in competing with 
foreign universal banks that are not required to comply with similar con-
straints.273 Again, there are persuasive rebuttals to this objection. For one 
thing, government officials in the U.K. have given serious consideration 
to the possible adoption of a narrow banking proposal developed by John 
Kay.274 If the U.S. and the U.K. both decided to implement a narrow 
                                                                                                                       
 270. Wilmarth, Financial Conglomerates, supra note 224, at 126–27. 
 271. See Scott, supra note 233, at 929–30 (noting the claim of some critics that there 
would be “irresistible political pressure” for bailouts of uninsured “substitute-banks” that 
are created to provide the credit previously extended by FDIC-insured banks). 
 272. See supra Parts III.B–III.D. 
 273. See Scott, supra note 233, at 931; Kay, supra note 167, at 71–74 
 274. See TREASURY COMMITTEE, TOO IMPORTANT TO FAIL—TOO IMPORTANT TO 
IGNORE, 2009–10, H.C. 9–Vol. 1, at 52, 59, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtreasy/261/261i.pdf 
[hereinafter 2009 U.K. Treasury Committee Report] (expressing qualified support for 
Kay’s narrow banking proposal); King 2009 Speech, supra note 138, at 6–7 (expressing 
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banking structure (together with other needed systemic risk regulations), 
their joint dominance in global financial markets would place considera-
ble pressure on other developed countries to adopt similar financial re-
forms.275 
Moreover, the financial sector accounts for a large share of the domes-
tic economies of the U.S. and U.K., and both economies have suffered 
severe injuries from two financial crises during the past decade (the dot-
com-telecom bust and the subprime lending crisis). Both crises were 
produced by the same set of LCFIs that continue to dominate the finan-
cial systems in both nations. Accordingly, regardless of what other na-
tions may do, the U.S. and the U.K. have compelling national interests in 
making sweeping changes to their financial systems in order to protect 
their domestic economies from the threat of a similar crisis in the fu-
ture.276 
Finally, the view that the U.S. and the U.K. must refrain from imple-
menting fundamental financial reforms until all other major developed 
nations have agreed to do so rests upon two deeply flawed assumptions: 
(i) the U.S. and the U.K. must allow foreign nations with the weakest 
systems of financial regulation to dictate the level of supervisory con-
straints on LCFIs, and (ii) until a comprehensive international agreement 
on reform is achieved, the U.S. and the U.K. must continue to provide 
TBTF bailouts and other safety net subsidies that create moral hazard 
and distort economic incentives simply because other nations provide 
similar benefits to their LCFIs.277 Both assumptions are unacceptable and 
must be rejected. 
                                                                                                                       
support for Kay’s narrow bank proposal and for the Volcker rule as two alternative possi-
bilities for separating the “utility aspects of banking” from “some of the riskier financial 
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 275. 2009 U.K. Treasury Committee Report, supra note 274, at 70–71 (quoting views 
of former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker); see also TARULLO, supra note 203, at 45–54 
(describing how the U.S. and U.K. reached agreement on bank capital rules and then 
pressured other developed nations to agree to the Basel I international capital accord); 
Kay, supra note 167, at 74. 
 276. See e.g., Hoenig October 6, 2009 Speech, supra note 123, at 4–10; King 2009 
Speech, supra note 138; 2009 U.K. Treasury Committee Report, supra note 274, at 71–
74; Kay, supra note 167, at 14–17, 20–24, 28–31, 39–47, 57–58, 66–75, 86–87; supra 
Parts I–II. 
 277. See, e.g., Hoenig October 6, 2009 Speech, supra note 123, at 4–10; Kay, supra 
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d. The Relevance of the Schumer “Core Banking” Proposal of 1991 
In 1991, Congress considered, but did not pass, legislation proposed by 
the Treasury Department to allow banks to affiliate with securities firms 
and insurance companies by organizing financial holding companies.278 
During the House debates on the 1991 legislation, which was essentially 
a forerunner of GLBA,279 then-Representative Charles Schumer offered 
an amendment that incorporated a narrow banking proposal similar to the 
one outlined in this article.280 Representative Schumer argued that Con-
gress should not authorize financial holding companies unless it adopted 
his amendment, which he described as a “core bank proposal.”281 His 
proposal sought to guarantee that “insured deposits [are] used for low-
risk, traditional banking activities, and then if our large financial institu-
tions wish to invest in high-risk activities, they do not use the depositors’ 
money, they do not use insured dollars, but they go to the markets for 
money.”282 
Representative Schumer maintained that the FDIC and taxpayers 
should not be insuring such risky activities as “huge bridge loans to 
LBO’s, . . . equity investments in real estate[,] . . . foreign currency trad-
ing and trading in . . . derivatives, which is betting on futures.”283 He 
noted that “[m]ost of the large banks are opposed because they do not 
want to take the necessary medicine to make them better,” but he argued 
that “[t]hey need strong medicine, and only core banking provides it.”284 
Representative Marge Roukema supported the proposal because “the 
core bank concept is the only proposal before us to insulate the deposit 
insurance fund and protect the taxpayer from future bailouts.”285 She 
agreed that “insured deposits should only be used to finance [the] tradi-
tional business of banking” and should not be used to “finance highly 
                                                                                                                       
 278. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve: The Potential Risks 
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speculative lending, equity investments or other activities which should 
be done outside the Federal safety net.”286 
Representative Schumer’s core banking proposal was defeated.287 
However, he was undoubtedly correct in saying that his proposal was the 
“only amendment on the floor today that says we will not do what we did 
during the S&L crisis, and that is [to] use insured dollars for risky activi-
ties.”288 He argued that Congress had grievously erred in 1982, when it 
allowed federal thrifts to “expand into new businesses with the taxpay-
ers’ dollars.”289 He further warned that Congress would be confronted 
with a future bailout of the banking system that could cost “$300 billion” 
unless we reform the system today. Do not put it off. Do not delay. The 
taxpayers cannot afford it. Only [the] core bank [proposal] will protect 
the insured deposit system once and for all.290 
Unfortunately, Representative Schumer’s warning not only proved to 
be prescient but also underestimated the potential cost of allowing banks 
to expand into capital markets activities while relying on federal safety 
net subsidies. As the current financial crisis has made clear, Congress 
must mandate narrow banking in order to prevent FDIC-insured banks 
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from being used to subsidize similar high-risk underwriting, trading, and 
investment activities in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
The TBTF policy remains “the great unresolved problem of bank su-
pervision,” more than a quarter century after the policy was invoked to 
justify the federal government’s rescue of Continental Illinois in 1984.291 
The current financial crisis has proven, once again, that TBTF institu-
tions “present formidable risks to the federal safety net and are largely 
insulated from both market discipline and supervisory intervention.”292 
The crisis has also confirmed that TBTF institutions “pursue riskier and 
opaque activities and . . . increase their leverage, through capital arbi-
trage, if necessary, as they grow in size and complexity.”293 Accordingly, 
as I observed in 2002, “fundamentally different approaches for regulating 
financial conglomerates and containing safety net subsidies are urgently 
needed.”294 
To respond to that need, this article has outlined a reform program to 
shrink safety net subsidies, force SIFIs to internalize the risks and costs 
of their activities, and create a more level playing field between smaller, 
traditional banks and LCFIs. My five-part program would (i) strengthen 
existing statutory limits on the growth of LCFIs, (ii) create a special 
resolution process to manage the orderly liquidation or restructuring of 
failed SIFIs, (iii) establish a consolidated supervisory regime and special 
capital requirements for SIFIs, (iv) create a special insurance fund (the 
SRIF), financed by assessments on SIFIs, in order to protect taxpayers 
against the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and (v) mandate a “narrow 
bank” structure for FDIC-insured banks owned by LCFIs for the purpose 
of insulating those banks and the DIF from the risks of nonbank affili-
ates. 
In combination, my proposed reforms would strip away many of the 
safety net subsidies that are currently exploited by LCFIs and would sub-
ject them to the same type of market discipline that the capital markets 
have applied to commercial and industrial conglomerates over the past 
thirty years. Financial conglomerates have never demonstrated that they 
can provide beneficial services to their customers and attractive returns 
to their investors without relying on safety net subsidies and massive 
taxpayer-funded bailouts. It is long past time for LCFIs to prove—based 
                                                                                                                       
 291. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 475; see also id. at 300–01, 314–15. 
 292. Wilmarth, supra note 132, at 476. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
2010] REFORMING FINANCIAL REGULATION 783 
on a true market test—that their claimed superiority is a reality and not a 
myth. 
